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Abstract 
 
Today's process-oriented composition languages such as BPEL (Business Process Execution 
Language) offer a high level of abstraction and sophistication to Web services composition. 
However, such languages suffer serious drawbacks with respect to security, modularity and 
adaptability. Particularly, they lack the security features needed in distributed computational 
environments like Web services composition. In addition, they do not provide means for an 
explicit and well-modularized specification of cross-cutting concerns. They also do not 
support the dynamic adaptation with the environmental execution changes. In this thesis, we 
advocate new approach that provides systematic and model-driven security specification at the 
Web services composition level, in addition to dynamic integration in a seamless fashion. It is 
based on an extension of the BPEL meta-model with new aspect-oriented constructs for 
designing and building modularized, secure, conflict-free and highly adaptable Web services 
composition within BPEL processes. Moreover, we extend our approach by adopting security 
licenses in BPEL and provide process level license verification that replaces the 
monopolization of such validation at the Web services side. Furthermore, we introduce two 
different real-life case studies along with performance analysis and experimental results to 
demonstrate the usefulness of our proposition. Finally, we carry out a formal verification 
mechanism to ensure that the integration of the new security aspects does not affect the 
original behavior of the Web services business process, which remains deadlock and conflict-
free.  
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Chapter 1
Introduction
1.1 Motivations and Problem Statement
With the drastic success of Service-Oriented Architecture, a wave of innovations has been
unleashed in order to enhance the interaction between customers and service providers.
Particularly Web services are currently emerging as a convenient mechanism for automated
interaction between these distributed applications. This technology is assuming greater im-
portance as the public face of business not only by making business applications accessible
through the internet, but also by providing a complete structure for a business process al-
lowing different applications to collaborate together in order to deliver their services. Web
services have naturally greater security risks than traditional applications because they ex-
pose business components to hackers activities; therefore it is important to keep them fully
protected against these risks [45]. In fact, people using Web services expect their confi-
dential information to stay secure. Furthermore, with this high level of dependency upon
the services, it is essential that they are protected from any type of security breaches and
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threats. Hence the importance of developing tools that meet the need of the enforcement of
security requirements such as license verification, authenticity, authorization and confiden-
tiality into Web services.
Security Assertion Markup Language (SAML) [9], WS-Security [7] and other standard
security languages have been introduced in order to apply authentication, integrity and
confidentiality features in Web services. Practically, these languages define protocols to
specify how these properties can be enforced on the exchanged messages in order to ensure
a secure communication among the involved partners. Although this message-level security
alleviates such concerns at the Web services side, it causes major problem in the entire
composition. Typically, the problem arises when several distributed and independent Web
services are composed together in order to form more complex system.
In this context, Business Process Execution Language (BPEL) has gained a tremendous
interest by handling the orchestration, composition and interaction of Web services. Cur-
rently, BPEL is only given the responsibility of business modeling, while the message-level
security is left to each individual Web service. Subsequently, the security measures (e.g. li-
cense verification, authentication, access control, etc.) of the same user will be executed at
each Web service. Thus, this will affect enormously the performance of the BPEL process
due to the overhead of running the security verification code at each invoke. Moreover, in
such environment, the interaction between the customers and Web services is done through
BPEL processes rather than a direct communication. Hence the need of centralizing the
security at the process level instead of leaving it to each individual Web service.
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One way for hardening the security into BPEL process is to embed the security verifi-
cation code within the business logic of such process. However, the current BPEL abstrac-
tion level does support the modularity for modeling cross-cutting concerns such as security.
Furthermore, BPEL does not support the dynamic update of the Web services composition
at runtime. In fact, with the continuous growth of security threats and attacks, new coun-
termeasures and policies have to be released and updated accordingly. Hence, the security
measures embedded inside the code will be frequently amended. More specifically, when
any of the security measures changes, the user should stop the process deployment, make
the needed modifications and then redeploy it making all the offered services unavailable
during the update procedure.
Other more dynamic approaches were proposed to enforce security through policy lan-
guages like WS-Policy [4], XACML [19] and XrML [10]. However, specifying security
policies and licenses to govern distributed systems is difficult, error-prone and time con-
suming and often expressed with unfriendly syntax. Moreover, hidden conflicts that may
arise due to the diversity of roles in policies are difficult to locate and resolve. In addition
these languages are usually enforced at the Web services side not at the BPEL process.
On the other hand, business processes encompass diversity of Web services functional-
ities provided by different partners to grant more complex business solutions. This is the
main reason behind the diffusion of BPEL in many business domains. However, possibil-
ities of having software problems like deadlocks, in such remote systems, are still there.
Hence, for higher level of adaptability, there is a need to validate that the process is always
deadlock-free and all the activities are reachable. In addition, when adding security fea-
tures in BPEL processes, the correctness of their behavior should be verified as well as the
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consistency between the original and the attended behavior of the composition. Further, in
case new features are to be integrated at the same point in the process, behavioral conflicts
may occur. For instance, invoking one before the other can lead to security rule violation
or even inconsistency in the exchanged information. For these reasons, the door should be
opened for formal verification of BPEL processes to emphasize these properties.
1.2 Objectives
The main intent of this thesis is to elaborate a complete solution for modeling security
mechanisms, hardening them dynamically into Web services composition and formally
verifying their successful deployment after weaving. More specifically, our main objectives
are:
 Address the problems related to the daunting task of security hardening in Web ser-
vices composition by elaborating a fully-fledged platform for model-driven security
specification and integration in a seamless fashion.
 Address on the one hand, the problem of adaptability in Web services composition
by elaborating a context-aware approach dedicated to the specification of security
and business aspects within separated modules, as well as their dynamic activation
according to the changes in the execution environment, and on the other hand, the
behavioral conflict problem that may arise between the security aspects upon their
injection in the Web services composition by integrating a prioritized ordering mech-
anism.
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 Investigate the adaptation of standardized licensing mechanism inWeb services com-
position to ensure the fulfillment of security needs in distributed infrastructure.
 Provide a formal verification mechanism to analyse properties in the Web services
composition before and after weaving new behaviors.
1.3 Contributions
In this thesis, we first deliver a context-aware and model-driven approach based on both
WS-BPEL meta-model [32] and Aspect-Oriented Programming (AOP) paradigm. Our ap-
proach allows specifying security features in separated modules called aspects and dynam-
ically integrating them in Web services composition. It also addresses the conflict problem
that may arise between these aspects upon their application when they are superimposed at
the same join point in the BPEL process. Moreover, It introduces a context-aware solution
that increases the adaptability of Web services composition. Second, we present a formal
verification mechanism in order to validate some needed properties after adding the new
aspects behaviors in BPEL processes. Finally, we extend our proposition with a licensing
layer that allows service providers to link their services with security licenses and central-
ize their validation at the BPEL level. In the sequel, we provide more details about the
aforementioned contributions.
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1.3.1 E-AspectBPEL: Context-Aware and Model-Driven Framework
for Web Services Security
The main contribution of this work is building the needed platform that offers the ability to
dynamically integrate security aspects in Web services composition. The proposed solution
is not only model-driven, but context-aware and behavioral conflict-preventive as well. The
following are the related achievements:
1. Extending the BPEL meta-model to allow the specification of AspectBPEL security
aspects.
2. Extending the AspectBPEL language to solve the conflict problem between the as-
pects.
3. Extending the AspectBPEL language to offer a context-aware solution that increases
the adaptability of Web services composition within BPEL.
4. Applying a formal verification mechanism to verify the correctness, deadlock-free,
conflict-resolution and original behavior maintainability in Web services composi-
tion.
5. Delivering the solution as a framework that consists of modeler, generator, compiler
and weaver, and integrating it in Eclipse [28], a well-known open source BPEL de-
velopment framework.
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1.3.2 XrML-RBLicensing Approach Adapted to the BPEL Process of
Composite Web Services
The main contribution of this work is twofold. First, based on a synergy between the eX-
tensible Rights Markup Language (XrML) [10] and Aspect-Oriented Programming (AOP)
paradigm, it permits the adoption of security license in BPEL allowing service providers
to link their services with security licenses. Second, it allows the selection of particular
join points in the BPEL process in order to provide process level license verification that
replaces the monopolization of such validation at the Web service side.
The following are the added value for the proposed framework:
1. Adopting XrML in BPEL, which allows service providers to link their services with
security licenses.
2. Generating automatically the E-AspectBPEL aspects depending on the XrML li-
censes.
3. Offering a centralized process-level license verification.
4. Enhancing the performance of the Web services composition by identify selective
joint-points for the integration of the defined aspects.
5. Offering the ability to activate the licenses into the BPEL process at runtime and
without affecting its business logic.
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1.4 Thesis Organization
The remaining of this thesis is organized as follows:
In Chapter 2, we present an introduction on the concepts of Web services, WS-BPEL,
information security, Web services security, Aspect-Oriented Programming, and formal
verification. We also provide a small overview on the standard licensing language XrML
and how it is used for Web services. Afterwards, we discuss some of the related works
done in the area of Web services security, AOP for Services-Oriented Architecture (SOA),
Modeling security properties and BPEL verification.
In Chapter 3, we describe the proposed context-aware and model-driven solution. First,
we explore the approach schema, the Extended-AspectBPEL language grammar and the
WS-BPEL meta-model extension. Then, we present the elaborated architecture and im-
plementation that consists of a modeler, parser, compiler and weaver. We also show how
it is integrated as plug-ins in Eclipse. A formal verification mechanism is presented as
well. Finally, a complete case study on a Travel Booking System (TBS) is given in order
to demonstrate the effectiveness of our proposition.
In Chapter 4, we present an extension to the elaborated framework that supports the
generation of security aspects from XrML licenses, and their activation in BPEL processes
at runtime. First, we reveal the architecture and implementation of this approach. Second,
we give an illustrative example of an Inventory Control System (ICS) to demonstrate its
application and usefulness. Finally, we present and discuss the experimental results of the
performance analysis conducted on that system.
In Chapter 5, we summarize briefly the achievements and contributions of this thesis,
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provide concluding remarks, draw the future work directions, and present the list of publi-
cations derived from this thesis.
9
Chapter 2
Background & Related Work
2.1 Introduction
This chapter is devoted to the presentation of several concepts used in our proposition.
First, we present an overview about Web services. Second, we describe the Business Pro-
cess Execution Language (BPEL) for Web services composition and orchestration. Third,
we examine some of the main requirements for information security and review current
security standards applied in Web services. Fourth, we present the Aspect-Oriented Pro-
gramming paradigm objective and methodology. Fifth, we describe the formal verification
based on Petri nets, which we exploit in this work in order to verify some properties in the
Web services composition after the enforcement of security policies. Finally, we present
an overview and assessment of the current literature on the approaches introduced in the
areas of Web services security, AOP for Services-Oriented Architecture (SOA), Modeling
security properties and BPEL verification. We also highlight their limitations.
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2.2 Web Services
The current trend in the applications area is moving away from highly coupled systems
towards systems composed of loosely coupled and dynamically binded components. Sys-
tems built with these specifications such as service based applications are dominating and
becoming the innovation for today’s generation of e-business systems. Particularly Web
services present logical evolution from object-oriented to service-oriented systems. They
promote significant decoupling and dynamic binding of components that consist of multiple
services. Each Web service encapsulates the behavior of particular activities and delivers
a messaging API (Application Programming Interface) to other collaborating components
over the network.
 
Figure 1: Web Services Architecture
As depicted in Figure 1, Web Services are self-contained modular applications that
can be described, published, and invoked over the web. How does this technology work?
Practically, after developing the Web services, providers publish WSDL (Web Services
Description Language) files of their services in the UDDI (Universal Description, Discov-
ery and Integration) registry. On the other hand, service requesters find required services
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using the broker (UDDI) and bind to them by sending the appropriate messages. Web ser-
vices technology describes a standardized way of integrating web-based applications using
open standards over an Internet protocol backbone. The following are the used standards:
XML (Extensible Markup Language), SOAP (Simple Object Access Protocol), WSDL and
UDDI. XML is used to message structure, SOAP is the protocol used for communication,
WSDL is used to describe the services offered by the Web service and UDDI is used to
locate these services.
Compared to traditional client/server applications, Web services do not provide the
user with a Graphical User Interface (GUI). Instead, they are Application Programming
Interfaces (APIs) that allow different applications from different sources to communicate
with each other in order to share business logic and data through a programmatic interface
across networks. What makes Web services different? First, they are standard-based. As
previously mentioned, their application implies the use of XML, SOAP, WSDL and UDDI.
Because the communication is based on XML, Web services are not tied to one operating
system or any particular programming language. For instance, the client application can
be written in .net and running on a Windows operating system, while the Web service is
implemented in java and running on a completely different OS. Moreover, they are interop-
erable, so they connect heterogenous applications through ubiquitous web-based standards.
Furthermore, they offer to the user the ability to act on information anywhere, anytime and
by different type of devices.
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2.3 WS-BPEL
The high potential of Web services as an integration platform is achieved when several
applications and business processes are able to incorporate their complex interactions by
using a standard process composition model. The Business Process Execution Language
(BPEL) combines the power of business process management with the flexibility and uni-
versality of Web services. It is an OASIS (Organization for the Advancement of Structured
Information Standards) standard language introduced to handle the orchestration, interac-
tion and composition of Web services in order to achieve a business goal.
 
Figure 2: Web Services Composition in BPEL
BPEL [2] is an XML-based language that defines the control flow as well as the data
flow among the composition of Web services. This process-based standard workflow lan-
guage allows the specification of executable business processes. It uses WSDL files to
interact with each Web service, and publishes its own WSDL file to describe its incoming
and outgoing messages.
BPEL supports process flow constructs for conditional branching, parallel processes,
nested sub-processes, process joins, etc. It also introduces systematic mechanisms that
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deal with business exceptions and execution faults. Finally, it defines how each individual
Web service or composite activities within such process can be compensated in case any
exception occurs. The constructs of BPEL [6] can be divided into three categories: Actions,
Control and Fault.
Among the Actions activities, we have:
 Empty: Used for synchronization.
 Invoke: Used to call a Web service to perform an operation.
 Receive: Used to accept message data sent by a partner Web service.
 Reply: Used to send a response to the partner Web service identified by the receive
activity.
 Assign: Used to manipulate variables and partners endpoints in the process by
applying Copy, From and To operations.
Among the Control activities, we cite:
 If: Used to create a condition in the process. The If activity can be followed by
ElseIf or Else branches.
 Pick: Used to specify set of activities to be performed according to a received event.
A subelement onmessage is used when it is a message event, and onalarm in case
of alarm event.
 While: Used to repeat child activities as long as the condition is true. It may never
execute since the condition is defined at the beginning of the constructs.
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 Foreach: Used to execute its contained scope activity exactly N+1 times, where N
is equal to the finalCounterValue minus the startCounterValue.
 RepeatUntil: Used to execute child activities repeatedly as long as the specified
condition is true. It will always execute at least once since the condition is specified
at the end of its constructs.
 Wait: Used to stop the process execution for a certain period, or until a certain
point in time is reached.
 Sequence: Used to define a set of activities to be performed in an ordered sequence.
 Scope: Used to provide context for other nested activities with their own associ-
ated partnerLinks, messageExchanges, variables, correlationSets, faultHandlers,
compensationHandler, terminationHandler and eventHandlers.
 Flow: Used to define set of activities to be performed concurrently.
Among the Fault activities, we have:
 Exit: Used to immediately stops an an executable business process.
 Throw: Used to signal a fault from inside the process.
 Rethrow: Used to rethrow the fault that was originally captured by the immediate
enclosing fault handler.
BPEL provides extensibility to accommodate with some standards such as XPath (XML
Path Language) [21] for more computational capabilities. It allows writing expressions and
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queries, particularly in the control activities for the development of more sophisticated
processes.
WS-BPEL offers the ability to compose long-running asynchronous processes with
fault detection and compensation activities. This language is not only a platform-independent
but it also defines conditional behavior that captures other available alternatives without re-
vealing the actual decisions made. It offers a high level of abstraction for modelingWeb ser-
vices composition. Thus, modeling composite Web services using BPEL can be achieved
with some business process development knowledge and basic functional programming
expertise.
2.4 Information Security
With the rapidly growing broadband of online information exchange in electronic data pro-
cessing and electronic business, information security becomes more important. It is chal-
lenging to take the steps necessary to protect online businesses against malicious attackers
who could steal or damage vital information and bring a system or a business to its knees.
On the other hand, companies are put on alert to adapt their infrastructure and heighten data
security due to the changing intruder landscape. Good information security means that all
personal data are protected against theft and misuse and that the needed data are available
and accurate. The key concept behind information security is to maintain the confidential-
ity, integrity and availability of an organisation’s information. Because, this organization
can engage in commercial activities only with this information, the loss of one or more of
these attributes can threaten its continued existence.
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Information security is the protection of any computer-related asset from attacks. The
latter can take the form of various threats, where attackers exploit a system’s vulnerability
and perform malicious actions. The following are the main information security policies to
defend against threats:
 Authentication: Corroborating the identity of an entity or source of information.
 Access Control: Restricting access to resources for privileged entities.
 Data Confidentiality: Keeping data secret from everyone except those who are au-
thorized to access it.
 Data Integrity: Ensuring that data has not been tempered by unauthorized parties.
 Non-Repudiation: Preventing denial of previous commitments or actions.
Recently, Web services are finding a new role to play in a range of business applications.
This technology is used by an increasing number of companies to expose their products
and services to customers and business partners over the Internet. The security concerns
for these service providers are of paramount importance. In this thesis, we are mainly
concerned with security applied into Web services.
2.5 Web Services Security
To design, implement and deploy Web services, security concerns must be taken into con-
sideration due to threats associated with exposing their functionalities on potentially hostile
networks. Particularly, when sending sensitive information, some security requirements
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such as confidentiality and integrity are needed. Several standards have been introduced in
order to address the Web services security concern. Among these standards, WS-Security,
that offers a message-level security for Web services, and XrML that provides higher level
of security with the definition of licences. In the sequel, we will discuss both standards.
As an extension to Simple Object Access Protocol (SOAP), WS-Security [7] has been
introduced and published by OASIS in order to apply security in Web services. This stan-
dard defines how integrity and confidentiality can be enforced on the communicated mes-
sages in order to provide end-to-end security. WS-Security is not a security method by
itself. Instead it incorporates in the SOAP header information about the applied security
features. For instance, in case the message is signed to ensure integrity, the SOAP header
will carry the method used for signing the message and the resultant signature value. WS-
Security can define several mechanisms that describe how to ensure integrity and confi-
dentiality, and how to ascertain the sender’s identity. It also supports various standards for
authentication, digital signatures and encryption such as Kerberos and X.509.
The following scenario is a simple example that illustrates more the benefits of WS-
Security over regular SOAP. Listing 2.1 shows a SOAP message with Scott’s username
Listing 2.1: Excerpt of a SOAP Request Message
<wsse:UsernameToken>
<wsse:Username>scott</wsse:Username>
<wsse:Password Type="wsse:PasswordText">password</wsse:Password>
</wsse:UsernameToken>
and password being sent as plain text. It is rather clear that this message is easy to break,
while using WS-Security, we can apply authentication and integrate it in the SOAP header
security tokens to ensure the integrity of the encrypted soap body.
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Listing 2.2 shows Scott’s password digest obtained after applying SHA-1, concatenated
with a nonce and a timestamp to ensure message integrity and avoid session replay.
Listing 2.2: Excerpt of a WS-Security-SOAP Request Message
<wsse:UsernameToken>
<wsse:Username>scott</wsse:Username>
<wsse:Password Type="wsse:PasswordDigest">
KE6QugOpkPyT3Eo0SEgT30W4Keg=</wsse:Password>
<wsse:Nonce>5uW4ABku/m6/S5rnE+L7vg==</wsse:Nonce>
<wsu:Created xmlns:wsu="http://schemas.xmlsoap.org/ws/2002/07/utility">
2002-08-19T00:44:02Z</wsu:Created></wsse:UsernameToken>
Considering the workflow for digital content and services, it seems that the exchange
of rights information between the workflow entities is needed. XrML is considered as the
most advanced and mature language to specify rights within licenses.
 
Principal Resource 
Right Condition 
Issuer 
Issuer 
Grant 
Grant 
Grant 
License 
Figure 3: XrML License Structure
It offers the ability to specify the parties allowed to use the specified resources as well
as their rights and the terms under which these rights can be exercised. Its constructs
are precise and unambiguous. It exploits the advantages of the XML technology such as
flexibility, extensibility, namespaces, aliases and schemas. Moreover, it supports content
centric models such as e-book, and service centric models such as Web services. It is a
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language that can be used by anyone owning or distributing digital contents (e.g., software
applications and services) in order to associate licenses with these assets.
Figure 3 shows the structure of an XrML license that consists of grants and their issuers.
Structurally, each grant contains 4 items: (1) The principal to whom the grant is issued, (2)
the right that the grant conveys to the specified principal, (3) the resource against which the
specified principal can exercise or carry out this right, and (4) The condition that must be
met before the right can be exercised. On the other hand, the license issuer is the principle
who issued the license and can digitally sign it.
Listing 2.3: XrML License Snippet
<license>
<grant>
<keyHolder>
<info>
<dsig:KeyValue>
<dsig:RSAKeyValue>
<dsig:Modulus>sdgs9gj...</dsig:Modulus>
<dsig:Exponent>YHj87h24jn...</dsig:Exponent>
</dsig:RSAKeyValue>
</dsig:KeyValue>
</info>
</keyHolder>
<!--Right-->
<use/>
<!--Resource-->
<serviceReference>
<wsdl>
<nonSecureIndirect URI="http://www.AnyWS.com/wsdlfile.xml"/>
</wsdl>
<service>anyws:WSService</service>
<portType>anyws:WSPortType</portType>
</serviceReference>
<!--Condition-->
<validityInterval>
<notAfter>2013-12-24T23:59:59</notAfter>
</validityInterval>
</grant>
</license>
Listing 2.3 depicts a simple XrML license. It contains a grant that conveys to a principal
the right to use a particular service. Its structure is described as follows:
 <KeyHolder>: Identifies the principal of the grant described as the holder of a key.
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 <use>: Represents the right granted to the stated principle.
 <serviceReference>: Encapsulates the information necessary to interact with a ser-
vice.
 <wsdl>: Identifies a digital resource that specifies the location of aWSDL definitions
element.
 <service>: Specifies the name of a particular WSDL service that is described in the
WSDL definitions element.
 <portType>: Identifies the service’s port to which the service reference refers.
 <validityInterval>: Represents the condition that must be met before the right can
be exercised.
2.6 Aspect-Oriented Programming
Aspect-Oriented Programming (AOP) [8] has been introduced in order to solve the problem
of aspect tangling in the code. It is one of the most prominent paradigms that investigate the
use of aspects for the modularization of cross-cutting concerns. In other words, it aims to
isolate the main functionalities of the business logic from other supporting functionalities
through the definition of aspects.
Each aspect is a separate module that contains pointcut designators. A pointcut identi-
fies one or more join points. A join point identifies one or more flow points (e.g., method
calls) in a program, which is in our case a BPEL process. At these join points, advices are
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to be executed. Each advice contains some code that alters the process behavior "before",
"after", or "around" the stated flow point. The integration of the defined aspects within the
application code is called weaving and can be performed based on one of the weaving tech-
nologies, AspectJ [20] is an example of AOP implementations that offers aspect oriented
extension for Java programs.
 
… 
Advice A: before(){ codeA;} 
Advice B: After(){ codeB;} 
Pointcut 
Pointcut P = call (“m()”); 
Advices 
Joinpoint 
m(); 
… 
codeA; 
m(); 
codeB; 
… 
… 
Aspect 
Weaved Code 
Original Source Code 
Weaver 
Figure 4: Aspect Oriented Programming
2.7 Formal Verification
Web services composition is an emerging paradigm for enabling applications integration
across organizational boundaries. Accordingly, a current trend is to express the logic of
such composition using a business process modeling language tailored for Web services
such as BPEL. Yet, the composition of Web services in a large processes may impose a
complex interaction among the partners, thus it is error prone. For the last few years,
there has been a growing interest for the verification techniques, which enable designers
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to test and fix design errors during the early phases of the process development, or allow
designers to formally detect erroneous properties (such as deadlock) and verify whether
the process design does meet certain properties (e.g., behave correctly). However, BPEL
cannot provide these capabilities. Hence the need of mapping BPEL to a formal model that
can fulfill these requirements such as Petri nets [13].
Petri nets are formal graphical model for the design and analysis of distributed systems.
A Petri net is a bipartite graph, in which each node is either a place or a transition. Petri nets
have been extensively used to model and verify business processes. Because its semantics is
formally defined, a formal model of BPEL can be obtained by mapping each BPEL process
to a Petri net. Hence this mapping offers the ability to exploit the verification techniques
and tools developed for Petri nets in the context of BPEL processes.
The Petri Net Markup Language (PNML) [15] is an XML-based interchange format for
describing Petri nets. The two main reasons behind the use of PNML in this work are: (1)
Its emergence as the de facto standard language for expressing various types of Petri nets
and (2) the availability of tools [14] that translate WS-BPEL to PNML.
Table 1: Synopsis of LTL Alphabet
Unary Operators
 At the next time /in the next state
 Always in the future /in all future states
 Eventually /in some future state
Binary Operators
|| Boolean operator for logical or
_ alternative form of ||
! Boolean operator for logical implication
LTL (Linear Temporal Logic) [27] plays a significant role in the formal specification
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and verification of properties in reactive systems. In LTL, formulae about the future paths
in a model can be encoded. For instances, checking wether a particular condition will come
eventually true, if a condition has been satisfied then the other will be satisfied, etc. LTL
allows also the specification of other properties like Liveness and Safety. A large number
of common model checkers like focused on the application of LTL formulae. Table 1
interprets a synopsis of its alphabet. It shows each LTL symbol used and explains how
it is interpreted. In unary operators, the symbol "" is used to define the "Next" state
in the petri nets model, "" stands for "Always" and "" stands for "Eventually". In
binary operators, "||" stands for the logical "Or", "_" is its alternative and! represents
an "Implication". For more details about the Linear Temporal Logic, its syntax, semantics
and its state/event-LTL form, you may refer to [27].
2.8 Related Work
In the following, we discuss and highlight the limitations of the related works done in the
area of Web services security, AOP for Services-Oriented Architecture (SOA), Modeling
security properties and BPEL verification.
2.8.1 Web Services Security
Recently, Web services security has gained a lot of attention especially in the area of re-
search. Standards and research papers have been proposed aiming to provide policies and
techniques that enforce web services security. In this context, we explore the current stan-
dards for security policy description, their advantages, and limitations as well. We illustrate
24
also different work that is related to the specification of security policies based on the li-
censing concept and apt to be applied in the Web services environment.
SAML [9] is a product of the Security Services Technical Committee of OASIS. It
is an XML-based standard for communicating authentication and authorization data by
defining assertions that represent security credentials. It can be used to manage secure
sessions among numerous organizations. In addition, it can exploit several mechanisms like
password authentication. Finally, SAML delivers security tokens to legitimate requestors,
which allows granting the appropriate permissions.
IBM, Microsoft, and Verisign proposed WS-Security [7] standard, seeking to embed
security within the SOAP messages. It addresses authentication, signatures, and encryption
concerns. WS-Security describes how to exchange security tokens for authentication and
authorization of SOAP messages. It also exploits XML for encryption and digitally signing
SOAP message.
WS-XACML (Web Service eXtensible Access Control Markup Language) [19] is an
XML-based language to specify and exchange access control policies. WS-XACML, pro-
posed by OASIS, offers the ability to define principals and rules within authorization poli-
cies.
X-RBAC is an XML-based RBAC policy specification framework to enforce access
control in dynamic XML-based web services. It is proposed by Bhatti et al. [42]. The
framework consists of two processors: XML and RBAC. The first one is implemented
using JAXP. It is responsible for getting instances of parsed XML documents and sending
them to the second processor (i.e., RBAC processor). In its turn, the latter has the duty to
manage and enforce the policies according to the provided information.
25
A web service architecture design for enforcing access control policies has been pro-
posed by Agostino et al. [1]. Their proposal provides also an example of implementa-
tion based on the WS-Policy [3, 4] as access control language. The proposed architecture
consists of several modules: PAP (Policy Administration Point), PEP (Policy Evaluation
Point), and PDP (Policy Decision Point). The Policy Administration Point offers an inter-
face to ease the management of the policies. In other words, it allows to insert, alter, and
delete policies, while the Policy Evaluation Point takes care of enforcing them. To grant
access, at least one policy should be satisfied. Otherwise, access will be denied. On the
other hand, the final access control decisions are taken by the Policy Decision Point with
respect to the inputs provided by the PEP component.
The eXtensible rights Markup Language (XrML) is an XML-based specification gram-
mar proposed by Content- Guard [10]. It offers the ability to specify and express grants
within licenses associated with digital content, services and digital resources. It also sup-
ports also service-centric models such as web services. By providing a standard language
that is platform independent, it extends the usefulness of web services for service providers.
RBAC-WS-BPEL, proposed by Paci et al. [2], is a framework that uses XACML to
allow the definition of authorization policies and introduces BPCL (Business Process Con-
straint Language) to specify authorization constraints. In this approach, roles are associated
with the users by creating models similar to those in RBAC (Role-Based Access Control) .
Drawbacks of Existing Approaches and Relation to Our Work: The proposed so-
lutions aim to enforce the Web services security by handling the implementation and the
verification of the security features at the Web services level. Despite the usefulness of
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these approaches, their negative effect on large systems cannot be neglected. In more com-
plex systems such in BPEL processes of composite Web services, the application of these
solutions may affect enormously the performance of the process due to the overhead of
running the security verification at each invoke. On the other hand, with the continuous
growth of security threats and attacks, new countermeasures and policies have to be re-
leased accordingly. Hence, the security measures will be frequently updated. However, the
aforementioned approaches cannot offer BPEL the ability to dynamically make these up-
dates at runtime. Conversely, our proposal relies on the dynamic activation of AOP security
aspects into BPEL processes and centralization of security controls at that level. Hence it
offers BPEL the support to better accommodate with the changes in the security measures
at runtime without affecting its business logic.
2.8.2 Aspect-Oriented for SOA
Few researches have been introduced in order to apply the Aspect-Oriented Programming
paradigm in Service-Oriented Architecture systems including Web services. In what fol-
lows, we present the initiatives for adopting AOP in the Web services context. In [33], Kim
and Hong present a dynamic approach for the replacement of faulty services in WS-BPEL
processes. In this work, the authors take advantage of the AOP mechanisms and extend
the BPEL meta-model in order to specify aspect processes. In addition, they present a
weaver that supports a dynamic replacement technique that increases the reliability of the
Web services composition. Although this approach supports the dynamic replacement of
bad behaving services, it lacks the ability of integrating security and business aspects in the
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Web services composition.
In [30], AO4BPEL has been presented in order to improve the modularity of Web ser-
vices composition. It is an extension to the process-oriented composition language WS-
BPEL that allows the aspects to be added or removed from the composition at runtime. In
this dynamic approach, join points are mapped to BPEL activities and Xpath language is
used to represent pointcuts and several types of advices. For instances, before, after and
around are supported. However, this work has few limitations. First, it requires the use of
a special orchestration engine to manage the BPEL process, which makes it incompatible
with the major adopted BPEL development environments such as Eclipse, NetBeans, etc.
Second, it neglects the security aspects of BPEL. Per contra, our approach is compatible
with any BPEL engine and addresses the security requirements of BPEL processes.
The work in [31] introduces AspectBPEL, an Aspect-Oriented Programming language
that is built on top of the current AOP techniques. This language is adapted to BPEL in
order to allow the specification of BPEL security aspects. The proposed approach offers
the corresponding framework, in which the AspectBPEL aspects are dynamically generated
from security policies written in XACML. The framework supports also the enforcement
of these aspects in the Web services composition at runtime. However, AspectBPEL is
not a context-aware language whereby, it does not allow the composition within BPEL to
evolve according to the changes in the execution environment. In addition, it does not offer
a modeling technique to create design models for security features.
Drawbacks of Existing Approaches and Relation to Our Work: These works do
not consider the conflict problem that may arise among the aspects. Some of them are not
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able to dynamically activate these aspects according to the changes in the execution envi-
ronment. On the other hand, our approach extends the AspectBPEL in [31] with several
contributions. It provides a graphical interface to create deign models for security features.
It also offers the ability to specify context-aware conditions based on the values of the
BPEL process variables to increase the adaptability of Web services composition. More-
over, when several aspects are applied at the same join point, a behavioral conflict might
occur. Tackling this concern is also addressed in the proposed solution. Furthermore, in our
proposition, we introduce a formal verification methodology that verifies some important
properties in the BPEL process after weaving the new aspects behaviors.
2.8.3 Modeling Approaches
Some approaches were proposed in the area of modeling security properties. A UML based
notation was proposed by Epstein and Sandhu [34] to model the access control property.
With this notation, they were able to cast the Role Based Access Control Framework for
Network Enterprises. Practically speaking, using the stereotyping concept in UML, they
developed the classes and interfaces needed in such framework.
As for model-driven aspect-oriented approaches, there were also some interesting pro-
posals. Following a bottom-up approach and using UML, Kande et al. [35] were able to
model a code written in aspect-oriented programming language. Starting from the low
level, they wrote the code of a logging aspect. Then using the UML extension mechanism,
they added new model elements to create the aspect needed in the software design. Finally,
they presented the configuration model before and after the weaving process. Contrariwise,
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in our approach, we start from the design level to generate the Extended-AspectBPEL as-
pect code. In addition, our aspects are applied at the process workflow level not at the UML
model level.
Another model to code generation approach was proposed by Cooper et al. [36]. After
extending the UML notation of the FDAF (Formal Design Analysis Framework), they were
able to model an RBAC aspect of an online Banking system. Afterwards, they translated
the model to XML code to generate its corresponding AspectJ code. Yet, this latter does
not contain the behavior of the aspect. Therefore, the user should write it manually to
accomplish the implementation of the code. Per contra, in our proposition, the complete
code can be automatically generated using the E-AspectBPEL Generator plugin.
Drawbacks of Existing Approaches and Relation to OurWork: The first set of these
works did not cover the generation of the security code from the built models, whereas in
our work we are investigating the generation of AOP security aspect code from their cor-
responding design model. In addition, our aspects can be applied at the process workflow
level instead of UML model level. On the other hand, in the second set, the aspect code is
not automatically generated. Conversely, in our proposition, the complete aspect behavior
code can be automatically generated using our elaborated generators.
2.8.4 BPEL Verification
Modeling and verifying BPEL using Petri nets gained a lot of attention bymany researchers.
In [37], ServiceNet, a special class of Petri nets is introduced and applied to formalize and
analyse BPEL business processes. This three-layer model allows the verification of the
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BPEL process as well as the data flow dependency conflicts in it. The transformation rules
are presented as well. In [38], Hinz et al. translated the BPEL process into a pattern-based
Petri net semantics. Then using the LoLA tool, they were able to validate the semantics
and verify some properties of a particular process.
A method towards mapping a BPEL process model onto WF-net is proposed by Aalst et
al. [39]. Then, to verify the WF-net, they used a tool called Woflan. Hamadi and Benatal-
lah [11] proposed a Petri net-based algebra, in which they represent different composition
operators. They defined formal semantics to the proposed algebra. The used Petri net
semantics cover both standard and exceptional behaviors of the BPEL process.
Drawbacks of Existing Approaches and Relation to Our Work: As presented, sev-
eral approaches have been put forward to verify BPEL business processes using Petri nets
models. However, to the best of our knowledge, no such interesting verification approaches
has been conducted on BPEL processes after applying the AOP paradigm. In our work,
such analysis is needed especially after adding new behavior in the Web services composi-
tion. Therefore, we opened the door for a Petri net based formal verification mechanism in
order to analyze the BPEL process before and after the weaving is conducted.
2.9 Conclusion
We presented in this chapter an overview ofWeb services, WS-BPEL, Information Security
and Web services security. We also introduced some of the concepts for formal verifica-
tion of BPEL. On the other hand, we went through the major approaches in the literature
that are relevant to integrate security into Web services, apply AOP in Services-Oriented
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Architecture (SOA), Modeling security properties and employing Petri net based formal
verification for BPEL.
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Chapter 3
E-AspectBPEL: Context-Aware and
Model-Driven Framework for Web
Services Security
3.1 Introduction
BPEL is a standard language for Web services composition that determines the logical de-
pendencies between them. It defines a business process, in which it specifies the control
flow of Web services invocations and the data flow exchanged among them. However, in
the current BPEL composition of Web services, there is insufficient support to separate
cross-cutting concerns, which makes the maintainability of the composition a real chal-
lenge. Another shortcoming of such process-oriented language is the lack of adaptability.
In other words, the composition is predefined and does not change or evolve according to
the changes in the execution environment. In fact, any organization would like to be able
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to quickly respond to the changes in the environment and adapt its process accordingly
without the need to stop the process during the update procedure and then redeploy it.
In this context, few studies [30, 31, 33] have been introduced in order to tackle these
problems. The proposed solutions are based on AOP paradigm, in which the needed up-
dates are defined independently as aspects and can be dynamically activated in the Web
services composition. Nevertheless, these approaches could not offer a high level of adapt-
ability in such system. Also, all these studies did not address the problem of conflicts that
may arise between the aspects upon their integration. In fact, when integrating multiple
security aspects in Web services composition, a behavioral conflict [12] may arise among
them leading to security rules violation in the system. Such problem arises in case the order
between the aspects (i.e., the order of their invocation) matters when they are superimposed
at the same point in the process. For instance, suppose that an organization wants to add
two different aspects in the BPEL process (e.g., Encryption and Logging). The first aspect
will encrypt all the outgoing messages while the second one will save the data after invok-
ing the Web services. The conflict problem may arise in case the logging aspect is executed
before the encryption aspect as stated in [12], which results in logging sensitive data before
being encrypted.
On the other hand, another drawback of the BPEL is the lack of security. Recently, a
big attention has been given to the policy languages in the area of managing Web services
security, namely the WS-Policy [4], which is W3C standard and the WSPL [17,18], which
is based on the OASIS XACML standard [19]. Yet specifying security policies to govern
distributed systems is difficult, error-prone and time consuming, and often expressed with
unfriendly syntax. Moreover, hidden conflicts, which may arise due to the diversity of roles
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in policies, are difficult to locate and resolve.
In this chapter, we propose new approach based on a synergy between the BPEL meta-
model and the Aspect-Oriented Programming paradigm to achieve a secure, conflict-free
and highly adaptable Web services composition in BPEL processes.
The rest of the chapter is organized as follows. Section 3.2 gives an overview of the
proposed approach. Section 3.3 describes the grammar of the Extended language (E-
AspectBPEL). Section 3.4 presents the Extended WS-BPEL meta-model. Section 3.5 is
devoted to the presentation of our solution architecture and implementation. Section 3.6
describes the verification process. Section 3.7 introduces the scenario that will be used as
a running example throughout the chapter. Section 3.8 illustrates a complete case study
interpreting the proposed approach. Finally, Section 3.9 concludes the chapter.
3.2 Approach Overview
This section gives a summary of our approach that investigates the problems related to the
daunting task of security hardening in Web services composition within BPEL processes
as well as the dynamic adaptation of such composition with the changes in the execu-
tion environment. The proposed approach allows the systematic and model-driven security
specification and dynamic integration in Web services composition in a seamless fashion.
It exploits the Aspect-Oriented Programming paradigm to allow the definition of security
features and provide a modularity to separate them from the business logic of the process.
Practically, as depicted in Figure 5, the proposition is based on E-AspectBPEL, which ex-
tends the AspectBPEL [31] language with new constructs. In the one hand, besides offering
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the ability to specify security and business aspects, this new Aspect-Oriented language of-
fers a context-aware solution to increase the adaptability of Web services composition. On
the other hand, it has the ability to cope with the conflict problem that may occur when
weaving the security aspects in the composition. Additionally, we extend the WS-BPEL
meta-model [32] to allow the specification of security aspects using E-AspectBPEL. Also,
this approach provides a model-driven solution that offers a graphical user interface to ease
the specialization of security aspects.
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Security  Increase 
Adaptability 
 Design 
Security 
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Figure 5: Approach Schema
The main objectives behind this approach as illustrated in Figure 5 are first, offering
the ability to specify the security requirements in a design model. Second, enforcing them
dynamically in the Web services composition and third, increasing the level of adaptability
of such composition. Further, the proposition cannot be accomplished without verifying
that the security requirements have been weaved correctly, the weaving process did neither
affect the original functionalities of the BPEL process nor cause a deadlock problem in
the composition and the conflict problem has been resolved. Therefore, the fourth and last
objective is to emphasize these statements by performing a formal verification and analysis
of the Web services composition.
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The application of our approach consists of four phases: (1) Extending our AspectBPEL
language constructs, (2) Extending the WS-BPEL meta-model, (3) Developing a complete
framework including a modeler, generator, compiler and weaver (We leave the implemen-
tation to Section 3.5) and (4) Applying a formal verification mechanism in Web services
composition.
3.3 E-AspectBPEL: Extended AspectBPEL Language
In previous work, we have developed the AspectBPEL language built on top of the AOP
paradigm and adapted to BPEL. It is an Aspect-Oriented language that allows the definition
of BPEL security aspects through notations close to those of the current AOP techniques.
For more details about AspectBPEL, you may refer to [31]. In the current work, we extend
this language to offer two new contributions; (1) Solve the conflict problem between aspects
and (2) Offer a context-aware solution that increases the adaptability of the Web services
composition. Hereafter, we present the syntactic constructs of E-AspectBPEL and their
informal semantics. Figure 6 illustrates the grammar of the language (new constructs are
highlighted). The main constructs are detailed in the following:
3.3.1 Main Constructs
BPEL_Aspect Represents the BPEL security aspect. It consists of the keyword As-
pect, the aspect name and the BPEL_Aspect_Body. This latter implies the BPEL_-
Location_Behavior wrapped between BeginAspect and EndAspect keywords.
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BPEL_Location_Behavior Represents the advice-pointcut combination within an as-
pect. Each aspect may include one or many BPEL_Location_Behavior that is com-
posed of the BPEL_Insertion_Point, BPEL_Location_Identifier and BPEL_-
Behavior_Code.
 
Figure 6: Grammar of E-AspectBPEL
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BPEL_Insertion_Point Specifies the point where the code will be inserted with respect
to the BPEL_Location_Identifier. It can have one of the following values: Be-
fore, After or Replace. The Before and After constructs mean insert the new
code before or after the identified location respectively. While the Replace means re-
place the old code at the stated location with the new code.
BPEL_Location_Identifier Identifies the joint point or sets of joint points in the process
where the changes specified in the BPEL_Behavior_Code should be applied. The list of
identifiers used in the BPEL_Location_Identifier corresponds to BPEL activities
along with their signatures.
BPEL_Behavior_Code Contains the code written in XPath [21] language, that will be
weaved to the BPEL Process. This code is wrapped between BeginBehavior and End-
Behavior keywords. It will either be inserted before/after or replace the code at the
location identifier previously stated.
3.3.2 New Constructs
Figure 6 highlights the amended grammar of the language. In comparison with [31], it
shows that two new constructs are added: BPEL_Aspect_Priority and Activation_Con-
dition.
BPEL_Aspect_Priority Is used in order to identify the order between the aspects upon
their weaving in the BPEL process to avoid behavioral conflict situation. For instance,
assume we have two aspects encryption and logging, and both share the same join point
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in the BPEL process. Let’s consider that the data should not be accessible before being
encrypted for security reasons. This requirement will be violated in case the logging aspect
is triggered before the encryption [12]. Therefore, the order between these aspects plays a
significant role. Based on the BPEL_Aspect_Priority element, the aspect having the lower
priority will be weaved first in theWeb services composition. In the case of multiple aspects
that have the same priority, the order among them does not formulate a concern, therefore
it is determined randomly. Hence, using this element, the order in which the aspects will
be integrated in the program can be predefined by the user preventing a conflict problem.
Activation_Condition Identifies the conditions that should be met in order to activate
the aspect in the BPEL process. In other words, using this element, the user has the ability
to specify the BPEL variable value to create a condition for the activation of the aspect
behavior. For instance, let’s consider the case of a workflow where a user has three chances
to enter the authentication credentials (username and password) before being denied fur-
ther access to the requested service and a BPEL variable called faultyTrials that counts the
failure login attempts in the process. In this case, the aspect behavior (e.g., BPEL_Behav-
ior_Code) that can block the user from accessing the service won’t be activated unless fault-
yTrials reaches 3. In addition, the Activation_Condition can be a set of variables separated
by connectors such as "And" and "OR", rather than a single BPEL variable. This context-
aware solution certainly offers the Web services composition, within BPEL, a higher level
of adaptability.
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3.4 WS-BPEL Meta-Model Extension for E-AspectBPEL
We extended the meta-model of the WS-BPEL using E-AspectBPEL. The extension is con-
ducted on the BPEL_Aspect and the BPEL_Location_Identifier, which forms the essential
elements of our E-AspectBPEL language.
 
Figure 7: WS-BPEL Meta-Model Extension
3.4.1 BPEL_Aspect Extension
The BPEL_Aspect is like a BPEL process that encompasses some activities to define cer-
tain behavior. Therefore, we define it as a subclass of the BPEL process. As shown in
Figure 7, the BPEL_Aspect inherits all the properties of a regular BPEL process. However,
it extends it with the new element priority needed to solve the conflict problem that may
arise when weaving different aspects in the BPEL process. As illustrated in Figure 7, the
BPEL_Aspect may be composed of one or more (1..*) BPEL_Location_Behavior. This
latter is composed of the BPEL_Insertion_Point, BPEL_Location_Identifier and BPEL_-
Behavior_Code. The last element contains the BPEL activities that will be weaved in the
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BPEL process. Thus it inherits its properties from the BPEL Activity class. The first two
elements pinpoint the location in the BPEL process where the BPEL_Behavior_Code will
be integrated.
3.4.2 BPEL_Location_Identifier Extension
The BPEL_Location_Identifier element extends the ExtensionActivity element with the
activityName and activityType elements. Both are mapped to an activity in the BPEL
process to help identifying the BPEL_Location_Identifier. On the other hand, it adds also
the expression element to formulate a context-aware model. The expression element is
written in XPath and generated automatically based on the BPEL process Variables. It
defines the circumstances that should be met to dynamically activate the aspect behavior
(as explained in the Activation_Condition element in the previous section).
3.5 Framework Architecture and Implementation
This section is devoted for the developed framework. It gives details about its architecture
and implementation.
3.5.1 Architecture
Figure 31 depicts the framework architecture as well as the interaction among its com-
ponents. As shown in the figure, our proposition consists of the four modules of E-
AspectBPEL: Modeler, Generator, Compiler and Weaver. On the other hand, the numbers
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in Figure 31 reflects the order of interaction between these modules to achieve our objective
of generating a secure and highly adaptable Web services composition in BPEL processes.
The first step is to design the security aspects independently using the E-AspectBPEL
Modeler. Once done, as a second step, the Generator automatically generates its corre-
sponding code. This latter is written using the E-AspectBPEL language (Figure 6). In the
third step, the Compiler makes sure that the generated code is compatible with the syntax
of the E-AspectBPEL language. In the back end, it calls the BPEL Validator that validates
the behavior code of the aspect against the WS-BPEL schema to ensure its correctness. If
the compilation ends successfully, the system achieves the fourth and fifth steps. In these
steps, the weaver takes the generated code along with the original BPEL process to enforce
the security properties into it, hence producing a secure and highly adaptable BPEL process
(S and HA BPEL Process in Figure 31).
3.5.2 Implementation
In the sequel, we explain the implementation details of the framework components.
E-AspectBPEL Modeler
After extending the AspectBPEL language, we extended theWS-BPELmeta-model as well
in order to allow the specification of the security aspects. On top of both extensions, we
developed the E-AspectBPEL Modeler that offers an easy and visual solution to design
such requirements. Owing to the fact that the behavior of the aspects consists of BPEL
activities, we developed the modeler by extending the BPEL editor itself. We created the
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core model of the E-AspectBPEL aspect where we specified the elements and the attributes
needed.
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Figure 8: Framework Architecture
E-AspectBPEL Generator
To automatically generate the code corresponding to the aspect design, we developed this
generator tool. It is implemented based on the DOM parser [49] for XML, using the Java
language. The generator sets the name and the priority level values of the BPEL_Aspect
based on the model. Afterwards, it extracts the BPEL_Insertion_Point element. Then, it
fetches the activityName and the activityType combination to build up the BPEL_Loca-
tion_Identifier element. Finally, the generator derives the BPEL activities nodes of the
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aspect module to compose its behavior. To recall these elements in the E-AspectBPEL
language, you may refer to Sections 3.3 and 3.4.
E-AspectBPEL Compiler
After writing the E-AspectBPEL language grammar using the ANTLR V3.0 [50], we cre-
ated the corresponding compiler. It allows the verifying the correctness of the built design
using the pre-described modeler. Typically, the compilation is conducted in two phases. In
the first phase, the compiler makes sure that the generated code is compatible with the new
E-AspectBPEL language constructs. In other words, the design model is correct and all
the required elements of the aspect are defined. In the second phase the compiler invokes
a submodule called BPEL validator to verify the behavior code of the aspect against the
WS-BPEL schema definition [51] to ensure its correctness.
E-AspectBPEL Weaver
In previous achievement [31], we developed similar tool that allows the automatic and dy-
namic integration of security aspects in Web services composition within BPEL processes.
However, in this work, we extend this tool with two utilities. First, the weaver is upgraded
to support the injection of several aspects so that the user may select more than aspect to be
weaved in the BPEL process rather than only one. The second added value is an ordering
mechanism integrated in this tool whereby the weaver is able to order these aspects based
on their priority level to avoid the behavioral conflict problem among them. Afterwards, it
extracts the insertion point (e.g., Before, After or Replace) as well as the location identifier
from the aspect code. Both elements pinpoint to the exact spot in the BPEL process where
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the behavior code should be injected. Finally, it activates dynamically the aspect behavior
based on the Activation_Condition element.
3.5.3 Integration into Eclipse Platform
Integrating the proposed framework in one of most adopted BPEL development environ-
ments such as Eclipse offers without doubt considerable contribution that demonstrates the
feasibility of our approach. Therefore, we implemented all the components (e.g., Modeler,
Generator, Compiler and Weaver) as eclipse plug-ins projects.
 
(a) Extended Palette 
with Aspect Element 
 
(b) Extended Properties Section 
 
 
 
 
 
(c) Extended-AspectBPEL View 
 
Figure 9: E-AspectBPEL Eclipse Plug-ins
The plug-in uses the Extended WSB-PEL Meta-Model presented in Section 3.4 as well
as the E-AspectBPEL Language introduced in Section 3.3, and provides the modeling and
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weaving capabilities needed to design and weave the aspects specified into the BPEL pro-
cess. The plug-in provides also a graphical user interface to ease the specification of aspects
and their dynamic weaving. Practically, the E-AspectBPEL Modeler extends the palette
component in the BPEL editor of Eclipse in order to attach the aspect module. We ex-
tended the properties section as well in order to add all the elements needed for the aspect
specification. Figure 9 (a) and (b) illustrates both extensions respectively. On the other
hand, as depicted in Figure 9 (c), we created an advanced view plug-in using the JFace [29]
viewer hierarchy to include the E-AspectBPEL Generator, Compiler and Weaver.
3.6 Formal Verification Mechanism
BPEL is so far the most important standard language for composing Web services. It
describes the behavior of the Web services and their interactions by defining a business
process from a high level point of view. However, problems may arise during the execution
of the business process. For instances, problem of deadlock and reachability. Hence, there
is a definitive need for formal verification and analysis of the control flow in BPEL specially
after integrating new behavior in the composition. In the sequel, we present few objectives
for the verification of BPEL process.
First, We have to validate that the process behavior is consistent with the attended be-
havior, especially after the injection of the security aspects. For instance, if we look at
the scenario in Section 3.7, integrating any new behavior in the Web services composi-
tion should not affect the original behavior that ensures the invoke of the payment service
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whenever one of the reservation Web services get invoked. Let us assume that new authen-
tication aspect is weaved just before calling the payment service and not at the beginning
of the process. In this case, an unauthenticated user will have the ability to call the reserva-
tion services but the payment will never get invoked. For security purposes, such sequence
of transactions should be atomic, and in case of illegitimate user, the process should roll
back all previous transactions (i.e., reservations). However, BPEL does not support this
flexibility. Therefore, making sure that such contradictory case won’t occur will be one of
the concerns addressed through our approach.
Second, we have to verify that the integration of these aspects did not cause a deadlock
problem in the BPEL process and all the activities in the composition remains reachable.
For example, after integrating the authentication aspect, the process has to preserve its
ability to respond to any request made by the user despite its status (e.g., authenticated or
not). Subsequently, it should be able to always reach its final state whereby it sends an error
message in case the user is not authenticated, or another confirmation message otherwise.
Third, we have to make sure that the aspects have been weaved correctly. As a case
in point, adding authentication should guarantee that only legitimate users can invoke the
offered services. Even in other situation, for example when injecting discount and logging
aspects, the process should guarantee that checking for discount won’t proceed logging.
Otherwise, the process will end up with erroneous values. For instance, when the discount
is applied, faulty data related to total fees will be logged. And finally, we have to prove
that the conflict problem has been resolved. Taking the example of encryption and logging
aspects, the solution has to assure that the data won’t be logged unless it has been encrypted
first, and this through invoking encryption before logging, and not vice versa.
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Different verification techniques and tools have been developed in order to ensure the
consistency between the business process and some particular properties. In the sequel, we
present the proposed technique depicted in Figure 10 that exploits the Petri Net Markup
Language and Linear Temporal Logic formulaes in order to achieve such verification. As
illustrated in Figure 10, the semantics of BPEL are first translated to Petri net [13], which
is a graphical and mathematical formal modeling language applicable to many processing
distributed systems. So many tools were introduced in order to convert BPEL processes into
Petri nets. BPEL2oWFN [14] is one of them and is open-source. It takes the BPEL file and
generates its corresponding Petri nets. The latter can be expressed in many languages like
the Open Workflow Net (oWFN) and the Petri Nets Markup Language known as PNML
[15]. The latter is an XML-based language and can be used for further conversion to
accomplish the verification and the analysis of the BPEL process. 
BPEL 
Process 
BPEL- 
2oWFN 
Tool 
PNML 
File 
TINA 
Tool 
KTZ 
File 
LTL 
Property 
 
Result 
Figure 10: Verification Methodology
On the other hand, in order to apply model checking that verifies whether the business
process meets a given specification, it is important to define the properties to be verified.
The Linear Temporal Logic (LTL) [27] is one of the techniques used to express such prop-
erties for formal verification. Several concepts can be formally specified with LTL such
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as liveness, safety, fairness and other properties. We opted to adopt LTL due to its intu-
itive appeal, widespread use and well developed proof and decision procedures. Once the
properties are specified in LTL formulae, they can be verified against the BPEL model.
However, these formulae cannot be verified directly against the PNML file generated in the
first step. Subsequently, this latter should be converted into another format before starting
the verification process. As depicted in Figure10, using the TINA model checker [16],
PNML can be converted to KTZ file and verified against the specified properties. The
KTZ is the binary format for Kripke transition system of TINA. TINA package contains
an LTL model checker called Tina-selt. This tool can check the KTZ file, which represents
the BPEL file after conversion, against the properties expressed in LTL. A boolean result
is conducted when the verification process is completed. In other words, Tina-selt prints
TRUE if the property is verified and FALSE if not.
3.7 Illustrative Example
To better illustrate our approach, we suggest a Travel Booking System (TBS) as a running
example. The system consists of four Web services, a BPEL process and a graphical user
interface that allows users to invoke the four Web services as depicted in Figure 11.
The four Web services of our TBS are the following:
 Flight Web Service: allows the user to book a ticket on a certain flight.
 Hotel Web Service: enables the user to book a hotel room.
 Car Web Service: allows the user to reserve a car during the trip.
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 Banking Web Service: gives the user the ability to perform an online payment for the
reservation fees.
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Figure 11: Travel Booking System Components
The user may invoke one, two or even the three reservation Web services before get-
ting to the online payment. As illustrated in Figure 17, in such complex system, different
scenarios might occur and several paths might taken according to the user request. How-
ever, the system imposes the invoke of the payment service whenever one of the booking
Web services (i.e., Flight, Hotel and Car) get invoked to achieve an atomic sequence of
transactions.
3.8 Case Study
This Section describes the application of the proposed approach on the example given in
Section 3.7. It illustrates the specification of different aspects and their enforcement in the
Web services composition in order to achieve a secure and highly adaptable BPEL process.
It shows also the conducted formal verification methodology with the obtained results and
their analysis.
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3.8.1 E-AspectBPEL Aspect Specification
This concrete case study depicts the specification and integration of 4 different aspects in
the Travel Booking System;
Security Aspects: Authentication that allows verifying whether the provided credentials
authenticate a legitimate user or not. Logging that keeps track of the data exchanged in the
process. Encryption that encrypts all outgoing message.
Business Aspect: Discount that applies discount on the total fees in case the user has
booked a complete travel package. In other words, he/she has booked a ticket, hotel room
and a car.
Figures 12, 13, 14, and 15 illustrate the specification of these aspects using our E-
AspectBPEL Modeler plugin. To start the design of any aspect, we drag and drop the
aspect module from the palette, create its model and finally, specify its properties (e.g.,
priority level, location identifier etc.).
As shown in Figure 12, the Authentication aspect behavior determines if the user is
legitimate or not by verifying the credentials entered by the user. If the authentication fails,
the process assigns an appropriate error message to the BPEL output variable, forwards it
back to the user and then stops. Otherwise the process continues its execution by invoking
the appropriate Web service(s). In the properties section, we define all the needed details.
Practically speaking, the Authentication aspect has: Priority level = 0, Insertion point =
After and Location identifier = receive <receiveInput>. Based on these properties, this
aspect will be weaved right after receiving the request from the user (i.e., At the beginning
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of the BPEL process). The priority level is neglected since Authentication is the only aspect
that will be injected at this joinpoint in the process having no effect on other aspects.
 
Figure 12: Authentication Aspect Specification
Figure 13 shows an aspect, in which a discount is applied on the total booking fees
before paying. Aside, to benefit from this discount, the user should book a complete travel
package such that scenario 7 in Figure 17 is applied (i.e., last ElseIf path is followed).
Thus, the activation of this aspect is conditioned by the variable isBookCompletePack-
age, in the BPEL process, that must have the value true. As shown in Figure 13, we select
this variable from the list and we specify its value. This context-aware solution increases
the adaptability of the Web services composition since it allows the process to evolve based
on the modifications that occur in the environment variables. Subsequently, these are the
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properties of the Discount aspect: Priority level = 1, Insertion point = Before and Lo-
cation identifier = assign <Assign Payment Info To BWS> Activation Condition =
$isBookCompletePackage=true.
 
Figure 13: Discount Aspect Specification
In Figure 14, the Encryption aspect contains an invoke activity that calls the encrypt
method in order to encrypt the assigned data. It has the following properties: Priority level
= 2, Insertion point = Before and Location identifier = assign <Assign Payment Info To
BWS>. Further, Figure 15 illustrates the Logging aspect that can log the exchanged data
by invoking the log method. The following are the associated properties: Priority level
= 3, Insertion point = Before and Location identifier = assign <Assign Payment Info
To BWS>. All three aspects share the same join point (i.e., same combination of insertion
point and location identifier) in the BPEL process, which may cause a conflict problem
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among them and lead to both security violation and erroneous data.
 
Figure 14: Encryption Aspect Specification
As case in point, suppose that the Logging aspect is weaved before the Encryption,
then all sensitive data such those associated with the online payment service will be saved
as clear text breaking confidentiality. Further, let’s assume that the Logging precedes the
Discount aspect as well. In such case, faulty data might be logged leading to erroneous
BPEL process. For instance, the total fees value can get modified in case the discount
is applied. However, by giving these aspects the correct priority values, our Weaver will
take care later on of ordering them to avoid such problems. As predefined in the figures,
the Discount aspect has priority of 1, Encryption with priority of 2 and 3 for the Logging
aspect.
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 Figure 15: Logging Aspect Specification
3.8.2 E-AspectBPEL Aspect Integration
In order to integrate the pre-defined aspects in the Web services composition of the TBS,
the followings are the steps to be followed.
 Generate E-AspectBPEL code from the design: Having the aspects specified, their
corresponding code is automatically generated using our E-AspectBPEL Generator.
 Compile E-AspectBPEL code: During this step, the generated code is compiled to
make sure that we did not miss any element in the aspect specification phase. As
seen in Figure 16, our E-AspectBPEL Compiler displays a message confirming that
the compilation has ended successfully.
 Weave E-AspectBPEL aspect: In this last step comes the role of the Weaver plugin
that first orders the Discount, Logging and Encryption aspects based on their priority
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level to prevent the conflict between them and avoid any security violation or erro-
neous process situation. Then, it matches the location identifier of all the aspects
with the BPEL activities. Based on the insertion types and the stated locations, these
aspects are weaved in the BPEL process.
 
 
 
 
 
  
Figure 16: Aspects Integration
Figure 18 shows the BPEL process after the weaving. The Authentication aspect is
injected at the beginning of the process to ensure that only legitimate users are able to
access the TBS services. On the other hand, Discount, Encryption and Logging aspects are
weaved in the correct order. The Discount aspect is weaved first, yet not activated unless
the isBookCompletePackage variable value is equal to true. This is reflected in Figure
18 that shows the automatically generated If condition to cater with this requirement. It is
worth mentioning that the Weaving process is atomic. In other words, in case a compilation
error occurs in any of the related aspects (e.g., Discount, Encryption and Logging in this
case), the weaving stops and prompts the user to make changes in the erroneous model and
recompile it before proceeding.
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 Figure 17: Original TBS BPEL Process
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Figure 18: TBS BPEL Process after Correct Weaving
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Figure 19: TBS BPEL Process After Erroneous Weaving
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3.8.3 Formal Verification
In the sequel, we will show howmodel checking is applied on the running example to verify
the properties presented in Section 3.6. Figure 20 shows the petri net generated using the
BPEL2oWFN tool. It is induced from the BPEL process of our Travel Booking System
illustrated in Figure 17.
Each activity in the BPEL process is mapped to a transition in the petri nets model. For
instances, in Figure 17, the receive activity is mapped to transition t1 in Figure 20. The If
and Else If branches are mapped to t1, t2, t3, t4, t5, t6, t7, and t8 respectively. The assign
activities are represented with transitions having "asgn" label (e.g., Assign Request To
FWS is mapped to transition t9), while transitions having "invk" label correspond to
the invoke activities and the last transition t36 represents the reply activity in the BPEL
process. As depicted in the petri nets model, each activity in the process, which is mapped
to a petri net transition, is also followed by a place. For example, the invoke activity,
mapped to transition t16, is followed by p27 that represents the place in the system after
calling this particular activity. Finally, the arrows represent the arcs in petri net, which
create a connection between the places and the transitions. Same mapping rules applies on
the rest of BPEL processes and Petri nets models used in this section.
Figure 21 illustrates the Petri net corresponding to the process after weaving the aspects
specified in Section 3.8.2. It is generated from the BPEL process in Figure 18 obtained in
Section 3.8.2. As depicted in the Petri net model, it consists of 48 transitions and 43 places.
Transitions 2, 3, 6 and 7 correspond to the Authentication aspect so that if the user is not
authenticated, the process sends an error message to the user and none of the Web services
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will get invoked. Otherwise, it allows the user to continue with the reservation process.
Transitions 39 and 40 map the Discount aspect that invokes the applyDiscount method
of the Discount Web service (DWS) in case the user has booked the complete package
consisting of a flight ticket, car and hotel room. Finally, Transitions 42 and 44 represent
the invocation of the Encryption and Logging services respectively.
On the other hand, to successfully accomplish the verification and analysis of any sys-
tem properties, contradictory examples should be established. Therefore, we created in
this work a sample of a TBS BPEL process that reveals security violation, conflict and
inconsistency problems. The process is depicted in Figure 19. Contrary to our process,
in this example, the Authentication aspect appears at the end of the TBS so that any user
(authorized or not) can access the system services. Further, the Discount, Encryption and
Logging aspects are not applied in the correct order. Figure 22 illustrates its corresponding
petri nets model.
To start the verification mechanism, we generate the KTZ file corresponding to each
Petri net model via the TINA tool and then, we map systematically the needed properties
to LTL formulae.
Just to clarify: TBS.ktz corresponds to the Petri nets model in Figure 20 and subse-
quently to the BPEL process in Figure 17. TBSACW.ktz is generated from the Petri nets in
Figure 20 and BPEL process in Figure 18. TBSAIW.ktz is conducted from the Petri nets in
Figure 22 of the process in Figure 19.
Maintaining Original Functionalities Verification Seing that our approach is based on
hardening new aspects in the Web services composition, it is necessary to check if it is
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Figure 21: Petri nets of the TBS BPEL Process after Correct Weaving
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Figure 22: Petri nets of the TBS BPEL Process after Erroneous Weaving
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affecting the main functionalities of the system. In fact, there are some cases where the
original behavior of the BPEL process might get modified after weaving new concerns in
the composition. For example, our Travel Booking system imposes that the Banking Web
Service must get invoked in case any of the other Web services got invoked. However,
after weaving security aspects, this rule may not hold such as the case in Figure 22. In this
model, the user will be able to invoke any of the reservation Web services. But if he/she is
not authenticated, the payment service will never get invoked, breaking the declared rule.
In order to verify that this is not the case in our model (Figure 21), we used the LTL
expressions in Table 2.
Table 2: Original Behavior-Maintainability Verification
Ktz File LTL Expression Model Checker Response
TBS.ktz  (p27!  p29) TRUE
TBSAIW.ktz  (p27!  p41) FALSE
TBSACW.ktz  (p33!  p41) TRUE
To recall, p27, p33, and p27 in Table 2 map the places in the BPEL processes after
calling any of the reservation Web services of the TBS, while p29 and p41 correspond
to the places after invoking the payment service. Accordingly, the analysis of the LTL
formulas with the model checker responses implies that in the original TBS BPEL process,
in case any of the reservation services is invoked, the payment will get invoked. This is
due to the fact that p27 will always lead to p29. However, for the second LTL expression
that examines whether invoking reservation will lead to the invoke of the payment service,
the answer is FALSE. This means that sometimes the process won’t call the pay service
even when other services are invoked, which breaks the rule. This can be argued by the
fact that whenever the user is not authenticated, another path (p36 ! p38! p43) will be
taken by the TBS process and therefore, p41 is never reached even though p27 might have
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been attained. On the other hand, based on the TRUE response for the last LTL expression
that corresponds to our model, p41 is always reached whenever p33 is. Consequently, our
solution has no side effect on the main behavior of the Web services composition.
Deadlock-Free Verification It is really important to make sure that weaving the security
and business aspects did not cause a deadlock problem that blocks the execution of the
composed services. Consequently, we have to verify that all the activities in the BPEL
process are reachable. In this example, we will show that our approach assure that the
process is able to respond to any user request.
Table 3: Deadlock-Free Verification
Ktz File LTL Expression Model Checker Response
TBSACW.ktz  (p2!  ((p6!  p33) _ (p5!  p7))!  p43) TRUE
Table 3 shows the devised LTL expression used in order to achieve such verification. It
states that always p2 will eventually lead to p6, p33 or to p5, p7, and eventually achieve
p43. In other words, if the model checker response is TRUE, we can say that whenever a
user request the TBS services, the process will always be able to react accordingly ruling
out any possibility of a deadlock problem. As shown in the table, the result of the verifica-
tion is TRUE so that if it is the case of authenticated user, he/she will be able to invoke any
of the offered services and get back a confirmation from the process. Otherwise, an error
message will be sent to the user. Accordingly, our TBS BPEL process remains deadlock
free after the injection of the new aspects behaviours in the composition.
Correctness Verification In what follows, we verify that the BPEL process behaves cor-
rectly based on the Authentication, Logging and Discount aspects. Hence, we confirm first
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that only authenticated users can get access to the system and invoke the services offered by
the Web services composition. Second, we verify that the process won’t fall in erroneous
status by logging faulty values.
Table 4: Correctness Verification
Ktz File LTL Expression Model Checker Response
1 TBSACW.ktz  (p2!  p33) FALSE
2 TBSACW.ktz  (p6!  p33) TRUE
3 TBSACW.ktz  : (p5!  p33) TRUE
4 TBSAIW.ktz  (p2!  p27) TRUE
5 TBSACW.ktz  (p35!  p39) TRUE
6 TBSACW.ktz  : (p39!  p35) TRUE
7 TBSAIW.ktz  (p29!  p31) TRUE
8 TBSAIW.ktz  : (p31!  p29) TRUE
Table 4 illustrates the used LTL expressions. In the petri net model of Figure 21, p6
represents the case of an authenticated user and p5 the one of non authenticated user.
p5 represents the place in the process after invoking any of the reservationWeb services.
Whereas this place is mapped to p27 in Figure 22. In both models p2 represents the place
after receiving the user request. When checking if any user can access the system in the first
formula, the model checker response was False. In the second formula examining whether
authenticated users can access the system services, the response was TRUE. Same answer
when applying similar test for non authenticated users in the third formula stating that in
non of the cases, non valid users can invoke the services. Analysing these results assure
that in our approach only authenticated users can get access to TBS. Per contra, the fourth
formula in Table 4 shows that in the TBS BPEL process in Figure 19, anyone is able to
gain access.
On the other hand, p35 and p39, p31 and p29 in the LTL formulas on rows 5, 6,
7 and 8 represent the invoke of the Discount and Logging aspects in Figures 21 and
22 respectively. Rows 5 and 6 assure that in our model, always p35 will precede p39
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and in none of the cases, the inverse is applied. In other words, always the discount will
occur before the logging (in case the discount is applied) so that if the discount is applied,
the correct value of the total fees will be recorded. However, this is not the case in the
contradictory process based on the model checker responses for the formulas in rows 7 and
8.
Conflict-Resolution Verification The last property to be verified is that the TBS BPEL
process remains conflict-free. To do so, we have to prove that the aspects are weaved in the
correct order, which is the following: Discount, Encryption then Logging.
Table 5: Conflict-Resolution Verification
Ktz File LTL Expression Model Checker Response
TBSACW.ktz  (p35!  p37!  p39) TRUE
TBSAIW.ktz  (p31!  p33!  p29) FALSE
Based on the first row in Table 5, invoking the Discount aspect followed by p35 is
eventually proceeded by the Encryption invocation after 2 places mapped to p37 and the
latter is also proceeded in 2 places by the Logging aspect at p39, reserving the correct
order. Contrarily, this order is not respected in the Petri nets model of Figure 22 since the
model checker returns FALSE when applying the same verification.
3.9 Conclusion
We presented in this chapter a context-aware and a model-driven approach for Web services
security and adaptability. The proposed solution is based on the Aspect-Oriented Program-
ming paradigm and the BPEL meta-model. We extended the AspectBPEL language with
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new constructs. This extension addresses the conflict problem among the aspects. In ad-
dition, it allows the dynamic activation of their behavior based on context-aware solution
so that the Web services can evolve with the execution environment modifications. Hence,
increasing the adaptability level of the Web services composition. We also extended the
BPEL meta-model to allow the specification of such aspects. Furthermore, we presented
the solution components architecture and implementation. Its integration in Eclipse, one of
the most widely used commercial BPEL development environment, has been released as
well to emphasize its feasibility and to deliver it later on as open source contribution. Fi-
nally, we introduced a Petri nets based verification mechanism to analyze the BPEL process
before and after enforcing some security and business aspects.
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Chapter 4
XrML-RBLicensing Approach Adopted
to the BPEL process of Composite Web
services
4.1 Introduction
In this chapter, we extend our framework with an XrML-RBLicensing approach that takes
advantage from the current licensing concept in XrML and adapt into BPEL to cater for
the needs of Web services security. Using XrML, service providers will be able to define
grants within licenses and associate them with the offered services. The proposed approach
offers the ability to generate automatically E-AspectBPEL security aspects according to the
issued licenses. It also allows to identify some selective join points where these measures
will get dynamically activated rather than being executed at each invoke.
The remainder of this chapter is organized as follows. In Section 4.2, we depict the
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description of the inventory control system architecture. In Section 4.3, we present the
RBL-ICS model of the inventory control system. In Section 4.4, we illustrate the proposed
approach. In Section 4.5, we present the elaborated framework. In Section 4.6, we illustrate
the implementation of our proposal in a case study. In Section 4.7, we report the results of
the performance analysis. In Section 4.8, we conclude the chapter.
4.2 BPEL Process Architecture of the Inventory Control
System Web Services
This section explores the architecture of the Inventory Control system Web services and
their corresponding BPEL process.
4.2.1 Inventory Control System Overview
Inventory Control System, a common Web application is considered as case study to illus-
trate the feasibility of our approach. Figure 23 depicts the interactions between the user
and the Inventory Control system including the corresponding BPEL process and its com-
position of Web services. As illustrated in the figure, the security features are deployed
at each individual Web service rather than being centralized at the BPEL process level.
This monopolization definitely assures that any change in the security verification requires
a modification in the corresponding Web service.
Our inventory control system consists of a BPEL process, its composition of mainly
four Web services and a graphical user interface that contains in the main page all services
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offered by our system. For instances, order new products from different suppliers, place
an order, get stock reports, search for any sale invoice, generate invoice voucher and send
reminders for due bills.
Place an Order
Order new 
Products
Get Stock Reports
Search Sale 
Invoice
Send Due Bills 
Reminders 
Products 
Web Service
Shipment 
Web Service
Invoice Banking
Security
Security
Generate Invoice 
Voucher
Web Service Web Service
SecuritySecurity
Figure 23: ICS Architecture
The first offered service allows the user to order new products from suppliers while
the second lets the user purchase desired products encompassing the choice of shipment
request. The get stock report allows the user to check the availability of the items. The
user has also the ability to look for sales transactions and to generate invoice voucher for
customers as well as to send reminders for due bills. The inventory control system, en-
force security requirements by invoking security services such as authentication and grants
validation respectively with user request to access any of the offered services. Namely,
when a user demand one of the inventory control system services, the system fetches the
database record where the ID and the password of each user are stored besides its personal
information, and ensures that he/she is a valid user.
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4.2.2 BPEL Process Architecture
Figure 24 depicts a part of the architecture of the BPEL process of our inventory control
system. For space restriction, the figure explores only one of the BPEL process services,
           
 
Any ICS 
Web Service 
XrML Licenses 
Figure 24: ICS BPEL Process
called AnyICWSService. It is offered by one of the ICS Web services. This latter may or
may not run with security on the side. Once the user requests one of the services offered by
the system, the process gets invoked. Then, this latter assigns the Input to AnyICWSService
Request message. Afterwards, it calls the appropriate service and returns the appropriate
info. Finally, the Response message is assigned to the Output variable in the BPEL process
to be forwarded back to the user.
4.3 RBL-ICS: Role Based Licensing Model for an Inven-
tory Control-System Web Services
In this section, we introduce the RBL-ICS model of our inventory control system. Initially,
we define the RBL-ICS model; subsequently we present an excerpt of an XrML-based
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license specification for the inventory control system. We recall that XrML is an XML
based language for license specification.
4.3.1 RBL-ICS Model Definitions
This model includes several components: users, roles, grants, role hierarchies, user-role
assignment, and role-grant assignment relations. Users are assigned to roles and roles are
assigned to grants. An RBL grant represents the ability to access a certain system service.
A user is permitted to execute a service activity if he/she is assigned to a role that has the
grant to perform that activity. On the other hand, RBL roles are structured in a hierarchy.
Table 6: RBL-ICS Role Hierarchy
R
Manager {Employment=Manager, ID=integer of 9 digits,
Password=a string of at most 9 characters}
Employee {Employment=Employee, ID=integer of 9 digits,
Password=a string of at most 9 characters}
Supervisor {Employment=Supervisor, ID=integer of 9 digits,
Password=a string of at most 9 characters}
Customer {Employment=Customer, ID=integer of 9 digits,
Password=a string of at most 9 characters}
A: is the identifier of an activity (e.g., Order new Products).
R: is the set of roles (e.g., Manager, Supervisor, Employee and Customer).
U: is the set of potential users.
G: is the set of grants, (e.g., Execution of an activity).
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Definition 1: RBL-ICS Grant
Let ICS be our System. An RBL-ICS grant is a tuple (Ai, Action), whereAi is the identifier
of an activity in ICS and Action identifies the type of the action that can be performed on
activity Ai. For example, the tuple (Order new Products, execute) allows the authorized
user to execute the "Order new Products" service provided by the Inventory Control System.
Definition 2: RBL-ICS Role
AnRBL-ICS role r is a set of attribute conditions r= {aci j aci=AttrNamei op AttrV aluei},
where AttrNamei identifies a user attribute name, op is a comparison or a set of opera-
tors, and AttrV aluei is a value, a set, or a range of attribute values. Note that the roles r
and r0 might be recognized by the same set of attribute names. However, it is a must that
at least one of the values that the attributes of r and r0 assume must be different. A user
can be assigned to only one role while two users identified by the same attributes with the
same values are assigned to the same role since we assume that a set of attribute conditions
uniquely identifies a role.
Definition 3: RBL-ICS Role Hierarchy
Let R be a partially ordered set of roles. A role hierarchy defined over R is the graph
of the partial-order relation between the roles in R. If r, r0 2 R and r < r0, then we
say r0 dominates r. For instance, our inventory control system consists of four different
roles. The highest role is theManager, which has access to all the available services. The
Supervisor and Employee come next in the hierarchy. They have less access rights than
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the Manager but more access rights than the Customer members. The role hierarchy of
the inventory control system is depicted in Figure 25.
 Manager 
Supervisor Employee 
Customer 
Figure 25: RBL-ICS Role Hierarchy
Definition 4: RBL-ICS User-Role Assignment Relation
Let U be the set of all potential users and R be a partial ordered set of roles. The RBL-ICS
user assignment relation is the set of attributes UA={(u,r)2 U x Rj8aci=AttrNamei op
AttrV aluei 2 r;9attrj2 CredSet(u)1j attrj=AttrNamei
V
aci is evaluated to “true” ac-
cording to the value of attrj}. As for the online purchase system, the set of roles are R={
Manager, Employee, Supervisor and Customer}. Assigning users to roles results in a set of
attributes that defines the RBL-Inventory Control user assignment relation. For example,
in our Inventory Control system the set of attribute conditions for the Manager role is r=
{Type= “Manager”, ID= a string of 9 characters, Password= a string of at most 9 char-
acters}; thus a credential set of the user u={Type= “Manager”, ID=“Emma”, Password=
“Empass”} will be evaluated as “true” and u is assigned toManager.
Definition 5: RBL-ICS User-Grant Assignment
Let G be the set of grants of the activity A1 supported by the system, and RG be the set
of grant/role assignments. Thus, the RBL-ICS user-grant assignment relation is the set of
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attributes UG= {(u,g) 2 U x G j 9 (u,r) 2 UA j (r,g) 2 RG}. For instance, a grant to order
new items is assigned toManager by the RG relation. Thus, a user u can order new items
only if he is assigned first toManager.
4.4 WS-XrML E-AspectBPEL Approach
Our approach focus on enforcing non-functional requirements into Web service composi-
tions based on licensing concept. In the context of policy specification, several XML-based
usage grammar languages such as XACML [19], WS-Security [7], XrML [10] or SAML [9]
have been developed for access control, integrity, confidentiality, digital rights manage-
ment, authentication and authorization. They show their suitability in scenarios where
complex and composed security policies must be organized. They also offer the ability to
specify security rules in XML-based documents(s). XrML is a licensing language used for
expressing rights. It enables developers to establish the rights and conditions needed to
access digital content and Web services. Hence, to achieve our objective, we extended the
framework presented in the previous chapter with the eXtensible rights Markup Language.
Our proposition constitutes of three phases: (1) XrML-License Checker that validates
licenses associated with the offered services, (2) XrML E-AspectBPEL Generator that
builds automatically the E-AspectBPEL aspects according to the specified standard de-
scription of XrML licenses, and (3) E-AspectBPEL Weaver that dynamically enforces the
license into the BPEL process. The first phase exploits the license verification requirement.
The second allows specifying security concerns in separate XrML components and gen-
erates automatically their corresponding aspects expressed using our elaborated language
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E-AspectBPEL. While the third phase exploits the weaver presented in chapter 4 for dy-
namic weaving of the generated aspects in the BPEL process. In the sequel, we illustrate
the first two phases as the third one was already discussed.
4.4.1 WS-XrML for WS-BPEL
Considering the workflow for digital content and services, it seems that the exchange of
rights information between the workflow entities is needed. XrML is considered as the
most advanced and mature language to specify rights within licenses. It offers the ability
to specify the parties allowed to use the specified resources as well as their rights and the
terms under which these rights can be exercised. Its constructs are precise and unambigu-
ous. It exploits the advantages of the XML technology such as flexibility, extensibility,
namespaces, aliases and schemas. Moreover, it supports content centric models such as
e-book, and service centric models as Web services. It is a language that can be used by
anyone owning or even distributing digital contents like software applications and services
to associate licenses with these assets.
Although the use of XrML is limited to digital works and services, it is a comprehen-
sive rights language that provides an advanced syntax to describe both simple and complex
business models. Hence, it provides an advantage over other policy languages, which have
a complex syntax. In this context, we opted to adopt it on the BPEL process model, han-
dling a composition of Web services, in order to validate grants offered with the requested
services. As illustrated in Figure 26, one of the contributions offered by our proposal is the
decrease of the overhead caused by the security measures checking. In other words, rather
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Figure 26: License Checker
than validating the licenses at the Web services level, the proposed approach includes a
license checker at the BPEL process side. It checks and validates the license grants before
the invoke of the requested service.
4.4.2 Dynamic Approach For XrMLDeployment Based on E-AspectBPEL
Generally, Web service security is represented as policy rules that require real-time veri-
fication. For instance, licenses have to be verified at runtime to check if the user has the
privileges to perform the requested operation. Therefore, in order to enhance the dynamic
verification of licenses in Web services composition, we present in this work a synergy be-
tween XrML and Aspect-Oriented Programming particularly E-AspectBBPEL. It is based
on implementing security controls independently of the application logic by specifying
the security licenses using XrML, then generating automatically their corresponding E-
AspectBPEL aspects and weaving them into the BPEL process using our elaborated frame-
work. The generated aspects offer the ability to activate dynamically the license checker
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(see description in Sect. 4.5.2) and only at the stated points in the BPEL process.
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Figure 27: Approach Schema
Figure 27 depicts our proposed approach. It illustrates the BPEL process where secu-
rity features are embedded in E-AspectBPEL aspects generated automatically by the XrML
E-AspectBPEL Generator based on the XrML licenses. The comparison between Figure
24 and Figure 27 shows that the licensing verification feature is no longer part of the Web
services but rather developed independently within aspects modules, and hence any mod-
ification in the security licenses can be reflected in the generated E-AspectBPEL aspects,
which are automatically weaved and dynamically activated in the BPEL process. These as-
pects may contain direct licenses verification to be integrated at some identified join points
in the BPEL process, or it may contain an Invoke to external Web service(s) that handle the
verification procedure. Examples of XrML security licenses and E-AspectBPEL aspects
are presented in Section 4.6.
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4.5 WS-XrMLE-AspectBPELArchitecture and Implemen-
tation
In this section, we describe the framework architecture and implementation. We illustrate
also the aforementioned phases of our approach.
4.5.1 Architecture
Figure 28 illustrates the interaction between the components of the proposed framework.
As depicted in the figure, security requirements are specified into separated components
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Figure 28: Framework Architecture
and expressed using XrML licenses. Afterwards, our XrML E-AspectBPEL Generator
parses these licenses and generates their corresponding security BPEL aspects based on
the proposed E-AspectBPEL language. The generated aspects are then conveyed to the E-
AspectBPEL weaver with the selected BPEL process in order to produce a licensed BPEL
process. This latter communicates with our XrML-License checker in order to validate the
license grants at the process level.
82
4.5.2 XrML-License Checker
To overcome the issue of license validation measures overhead at theWeb services level, we
have developed an XrML-License checker. Typically, this latter get invoked at the BPEL
process level and only at the stated join points of the generated aspects. It is developed in
Java, and contains a method that start by parsing the license. Then, it checks whether the
assigned role has the right to invoke the requested service and finally, it returns an appro-
priate message. Using the XrML-License checker, our proposal provides also dynamism
by offering the ability to validate the license grants at the BPEL process runtime without
the need to stop its deployment once a license get updated.
4.5.3 XrML E-AspectBPEL Generator
To generate E-AspectBPEL aspects from XrML license, we have developed an XrML
parser based on the DOM parser for XML, using Java language. The parser gets all the
resources as well as their corresponding rights specified in each grant tag in the license.
Subsequently, each combination serviceportType of the resource element is matched to an
invoke activity in the BPEL process side. Then, a location identifier is generated for each
of them and its corresponding behavioral code as well. Each location identifier represents a
BPEL activity (i.e., invoke, assign, or any other activity). It identifies a/set of join point(s)
where the behavioral code should be applied, whereas this latter contains the code (written
in XPath) that will be weaved to the BPEL process before/after or replacing the previously
stated location identifier. The list of location identifiers is wrapped between a BeginAspect
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statement and an EndAspect statement. The behavioral code contains a call for the XrML-
License Checker that handles the license verification. For each grant specified in the li-
cense, a loop runs to get the corresponding principal, resource, right, and condition values.
The name of the invoke activities of the BPEL process can then be simply deductible from
the resultant list of combinations service-portType. Practically, the port type and the op-
eration attributes values of the invoke activity correspond to the portType and the service
attributes values, respectively.
The generated aspect is written in E-AspectBPEL language. It calls dynamically the
XrML-License Checker that validates the license grants. It includes also an If condition
forming a break point that determines whether the process gets to continue its predefined
path, or exits, depending on the checker response. The generated BPEL code encapsulated
in the behavioral code is mainly divided into two parts. The first one assigns to the XrML-
License Checker, the role corresponding to the login information entered by the user as well
as the right and the resource that constitute the invoke activity in the BPEL process. The
XrML-License Checker parses the license and returns 1 if the user has the right to access
the requested operation. This is done by simply matching the assigned values with the
data fetched by the elaborated parser taking into consideration that the specified condition
should be satisfied. Otherwise, the returned value is 0, while the second part constituted of
the If condition returns an error message to the client in case the checker response is 0 and
consequently stops the process. Else, it allows the invoke of the requested service.
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4.5.4 Framework Implementation
Our framework, which is illustrated in Figure 29, offers a user friendly environment to
perform a binding between an XrML license and a BPEL process. It allows automatically
transforming the XrML license into E-AspectBPEL aspect and weaving it into the selected
process.
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 29: XrML-AspectBPEL Framework
To perform the hardening process, the user should first select the "Licenses" menu. A
new editor pane appears under the "Licenses" panel where the XrML license is developed
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or loaded. Then the user has to select the "Generate Aspect" item to convert the XrML code
into an E-AspectBPEL aspect. Once this latter is generated, the user should compile it by
simply selecting "Compile Aspect" from the "AspectBPEL" menu. If a message appears
indicating that the compilation was successful, the user can move to the final step in order
to weave the generated aspect code into the process. He should go to the "AspectBPEL"
menu and select the "Weave Aspect" item. On click, a dialog box appears; requesting
the user to select in which BPEL process the E-AspectBPEL aspect code will be weaved.
A "Weaving Completed" message in the console appears indicating that the weaving was
successfully performed.
4.6 Case Study: Dynamic Enforcement of the RBL-ICS
Model in the ICS
This section describes the implementation of the RBL-ICS model illustrating all the pro-
cedures as well as the mechanisms presented in our proposed approach for the dynamic
enforcement of XrML-license verification feature in the ICS.
4.6.1 RBL-ICS XrML Specification
Listing 4.1 outlines a synopsis of the XrML-based license for the ICS. This listing includes
only the grants (Line 7 to Line 32) offered to the employee. Other grants are omitted here
due to space constraints. However, they are set similarly. Each grant contains the role (Line
8 to Line 17) to which the privileges are certified. These roles are structured in a way that
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the root is denoted by Manager. Followed by 2 sub-roles, Supervisor and Employee, the
Manager is granted all the rights to be performed on the associated resources. The Super-
visor and the Employee roles share the Customer sub-role and are assigned respectively to
varName="Supervisor" and varName="Employee". While the Customer is assigned to var-
Name="Customer". Each grant encloses the right (Line 20), the associated resource (Line
22 to Line 36) and the condition (Line 28 to Line 31) that must be met before the right can
be exercised, designated to each role. For instance, the varName="Supervisor" includes
generating invoice voucher that is valid during certain time interval.
Listing 4.1: Excerpt of XrML-based license for ICS
[1]<license licenseId="ICSLicense" xmlns="http://www.xrml.org/schema/2001/11/xrml2core"
...>
[2] <title>ICS License</title>
[3] <!--Grants set for the Manager, Supervisor and Customer--> ...
[7] <grant>
[8] <forAll varName="Employee">
[9] <everyone>
[10] <trustedIssuer><dsig:KeyInfo><dsig:KeyValue>
[11] <dsig:RSAKeyValue>
[12] <dsig:Modulus>sdgs9gj...</dsig:Modulus>
<dsig:Exponent>YHj87h24jn...</dsig:Exponent>
[14] </dsig:RSAKeyValue>
[15] </dsig:KeyValue></dsig:KeyInfo></trustedIssuer>
[16] </everyone>
[17] </forAll>
[18] <principal varRef = "Employee"/>
[19] <!--Right-->
[20] <use/>
[21] <!--Resource-->
[22] <serviceReference>
[23] <wsdl> <nonSecureIndirect URI="http://localhost:8080/ode/processes/ICS/ICSwsdlfile.
xml"/> </wsdl>
[24] <service>GenerateInvoiceVoucher</service> <portType>ns:ICS</portType>
[26] </serviceReference>
[27] <!--Condition-->
[28] <validityInterval>
[29] <notBefore>2011-11-01T00:00:00</notBefore> <notAfter>2013-02-01T00:00:00</notAfter>
[31] </validityInterval>
[32] </grant>
[33] <issuer>
[34] <dsig:Signature><dsig:KeyInfo><dsig:KeyValue>
[35] <dsig:RSAKeyValue>
[36] <dsig:Modulus>sdgs9gj?</dsig:Modulus> <dsig:Exponent>YHj87h24jn?</dsig:Exponent>
[38] </dsig:RSAKeyValue>
[39] </dsig:KeyValue></dsig:KeyInfo></dsig:Signature>
[40] <details>
[41] <timeOfIssue>2011-10-26T16:20:01</timeOfIssue>
[42] </details>
[43] </issuer>
[44]</license>
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4.6.2 E-AspectBPEL Aspects Realizing the RBL-ICS
In what follows, we describe the generated BPEL security aspect realizing the aforemen-
tioned XrML license of the RBL-ICS model. Please note that the syntax and constructs
of the aspects are specified in E-AspectBPEL language. At the beginning, our framework
compiles the aspects. It returns a failure message in case any error was found. Otherwise, a
message indicating that the compilation was successful is returned. Afterwards, it weaves
the generated aspect to the selected BPEL process. Our approach has been tested and we
were successfully able to verify licenses associated with the offered services at the BPEL
process level during its running time.
Listing 4.2: Excerpt of Generated E-AspectBPEL Aspect for License Grants Validation (a)
[1]Aspect GeneratedGrantsValidationAspect
...
[2]BeginAspect
[3]Before
[4]Invoke <GenerateInvoiceVoucher>
[5]BeginBehavior
[6] <bpel:sequence>
[7] <bpel:assign validate="no" name="MyAssign">
[8] <bpel:copy> <bpel:from> <bpel:literal>
[9] <impl:checkAccess xmlns:impl="http://t320.open.ac.uk">
[10] <impl:Principal>impl:Principal</impl:Principal>
[11] <impl:Action>impl:Action</impl:Action>
[12] <impl:Resource>impl:Resource</impl:Resource>
[13] </impl:checkAccess>
[14] </bpel:literal> </bpel:from>
[15] <bpel:to variable="PartnerLinkRequest" part="parameters">
[16] </bpel:to>
[17] </bpel:copy>
[18] <bpel:copy>
[19] <bpel:from part="payload" variable="input"> <bpel:query> <![CDATA[tns:input]]></bpel
:query> </bpel:from>
[20] <bpel:to part="parameters" variable="PartnerLinkRequest"> <bpel:query> <![CDATA[ns:
Principal]]> </bpel:query> </bpel:to>
[21] </bpel:copy>
[22] <bpel:copy>
[23] <bpel:from> <![CDATA["GenerateInvoice"]]> </bpel:from><bpel:to part="parameters"
variable="PartnerLinkRequest">
[24] <bpel:query> <![CDATA[ns:Right]]> </bpel:query> </bpel:to>
[25] </bpel:copy>
[26] <bpel:copy>
[27] <bpel:from> <![CDATA["ICS"]]> </bpel:from> <bpel:to part="parameters" variable="
PartnerLinkRequest">
[28] <bpel:query> <![CDATA[ns:Service]]> </bpel:query> </bpel:to>
[29] </bpel:copy>
[30] <bpel:copy>
88
Listing 4.3: Excerpt of Generated E-AspectBPEL Aspect for License Grants Validation (b)
[31] <bpel:from> <![CDATA["ICS"]]> </bpel:from> <bpel:to part="parameters" variable="
PartnerLinkRequest">
[32] <bpel:query>
<![CDATA[ns:PortType]]>
</bpel:query> </bpel:to>
[33] </bpel:copy>
[34] </bpel:assign>
[35] <bpel:invoke name="MyInvoke" partnerLink="PartnerLink" operation="checkAccess"
portType="ns:Evaluator"
[36] inputVariable="PartnerLinkRequest" outputVariable="PartnerLinkResponse">
[37] </bpel:invoke>
[38] <bpel:if name="If" xmlns:http="urn:http:namesapce">
[39] <bpel:condition>
<![CDATA[$PartnerLinkResponse.parameters= "0"]]></bpel:condition>
[40] <bpel:sequence name="Sequence">
[41] <bpel:assign validate="no" name="AnotherAssign">
[42] <bpel:copy>
[43] <bpel:from> <bpel:literal> <tns:MyProcessResponse xmlns:tns="http://myprocess.
localhost"> <tns:result>tns:result</tns:result>
[44] </tns:MyProcessResponse> </bpel:literal>
[45] </bpel:from> <bpel:to variable="output" part="payload"> </bpel:to>
[46] </bpel:copy> <bpel:copy>
[47] <bpel:from> <![CDATA["Access Denied"]]> </bpel:from> <bpel:to part="payload"
variable="output"> <bpel:query> <![CDATA[tns:result]]>
[48] </bpel:query>
[49] </bpel:to>
[50] </bpel:copy>
[51] </bpel:assign>
[52] <bpel:reply name="Reply" partnerLink="client" operation="process" variable="output
"></bpel:reply>
[53] </bpel:sequence>
[54] </bpel:if>
[55] </bpel:sequence>
[56]EndBehavior
[57]EndAspect
Listings 4.2 and 4.3 (for space limitations, E-AspectBPEL aspect code is divided into 2
parts, (a) and (b)) illustrate an excerpt of the generated E-AspectBPEL aspect for the veri-
fication of license associated with ICS services and realizing the XrML license of Listing
4.1. For space restriction, the listings depict only the E-AspectBPEL code that validates
the grants associated with the GenerateInvoiceVoucher service. The others are set in sim-
ilar way. As described in the aforementioned RBL-ICS model (described in Sect. 4.3),
each user is assigned a role and its corresponding grant(s). The RBL model reflected by
the XrML license has been generated as E-AspectBPEL aspect code. This latter integrates
the grants verification before (Line 3) the execution of any invoke activity whose port type
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and operation were specified in the XrML license (Line 4). It begins by assigning the
role, right and resource subjects of the user request (Line 7 to Line 34). Subsequently, the
XrML-License Checker parses the license and checks if access should be granted or denied.
As illustrated in the listing, the response of the checker is wrapped inside an If condition
(Line 38 to Line 54) that checks the returned value. If it is equal to 0, the BPEL process
continues its execution by invoking the appropriate Web service for the requested service.
Otherwise it returns an error message (Line 40 to Line 55) and the BPEL process exits.
4.6.3 Discussion and Experimental Results
Our approach produces a licensed BPEL process as illustrated in Figure 30 (due to the com-
plexity of the BPEL process, we show only one service, which we call AnyICSWSService).
To reach that goal, it starts first by generating automatically the license grants validation
aspect in Listing 4.2 from the XrML license in Listing 4.1, and then weaving them into the
BPEL process of the inventory control system presented in Figure 24. The resulted BPEL
process not only provides dynamic license verification feature for the inventory control sys-
tem but also, decreases the overhead of security measures verification at the Web services
level.
The licensed BPEL process begins by receiving the client role formulated from his login
information. It assigns the user’s role besides the requested service to the XrML-License
checker. Once this latter gets called, it parses the license and checks whether the client
is granted to invoke the requested service. If the access is granted, the process proceeds
and invokes the inventory control system Web service AnyICSWS and returns the user
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requested service. Otherwise, the process assigns the Web service response message to the
BPEL output variable, forward it back to the user and stops.
 
Figure 30: ICS Licensed BPEL Process
After performing an extensive testing, we were able to demonstrate the utility and the
feasibility of our proposition. First, we got the ability to successfully integrate the RBL-
ICS security features in the corresponding original BPEL process code. Then, we applied
some modifications on the license, which have been effectively and dynamically reflected
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in its corresponding generated aspects. Finally, we were capable to ensure that the original
functionalities of the ICS have not been altered after the modification that has been applied
dynamically onto the BPEL process.
4.7 Performance Analysis
This section summarizes the results of performance analysis conducted on the BPEL pro-
cess running in three different scenarios: A BPEL process that lacks of license verification
(LV), a BPEL process with LV (license verification) at the Web services level and a BPEL
process that runs with E-AspectBPEL aspect encompassing a call to our XrML-License
checker. Practically, In the first scenario, anyone can invoke the BPEL process activities
since it lacks of license grants validation. In the second one, the license checking property
is integrated in the Web services code while in the third one, this property is centralized at
the BPEL level that calls our XrML-License checker before invoking the requested service.
Table 7: Size of the ICSProcess BPEL and WSDL File
Without LV WebService LV E-AspectBPEL LV
ICSProcess.bpel 170 Lines 259 Lines 268 Lines
ICSProcess.wsdl 69 Lines 85 Lines 74 Lines
Table 7 shows how the size of the .bpel and .wsdl files of the Inventory Control System
varies from one scenario to another. It shows that the size of the process (i.e., Number of
lines of the process code) with E-AspectBPEL license verification is the biggest. Ascribe
that to the E-AspectBPEL aspect code integrated in it. However, in the rest of this analysis,
it will be obvious that this overload does not have a negative side effect on the BPEL
performance.
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Figure 31: Performance Analysis
The first chart of Figure 31 shows the variation in the execution time of the BPEL
process in the aforementioned scenarios with respect to the number of invokes it contains.
The stated values were measured using the Visual Studio profiling tool. As any profiler, this
latter allows to measure the behavior of a program as it executes (For instance, the duration
of function calls). As the results vary from one call to another, we decided to calculate
their average reducing the margin of deviation. As shown in this chart, the non-licensed
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BPEL process (BPEL without LV) enclosing 10 invokes runs in an average of 7776 ms and
reaches 68875 ms for 100 invoke activities. Conversely, the BPEL process of 10 invokes
with the license verification on the Web services side (BPEL with WS-LV) takes up to
9393 ms and comes to 85188 ms when enclosing 100 invoke activities. Nevertheless, the
BPEL process with E-AspectBPEL-LV runs in an average of 9136 ms for 10 Web services
invoke and takes up to 71562 ms for 100 Web services invoke. The chart shows also the
interesting result that we got; the line illustrating the execution time of the BPEL process
with E-AspectBPEL license verification is almost in congruence with the one of the non-
licensed process. This proves that the overload of the E-AspectBPEL code is not affecting
the performance of the BPEL process.
The performance analysis could not be accomplished without measuring the compila-
tion and the weaving time of the E-AspectBPEL-LV aspect. Therefore, using the Eclipse
Test and Performance Tools Platform (TPTP) [5], we have performed this test and the re-
sults are shown in the second and the third chart of Figure 31. The compilation and the
weaving time are in ms while the aspect size is measured in terms of pointcuts number pre-
sented in it. As shown in these charts, it takes only 1540 ms to compile an E-AspectBPEL
aspect of 30 pointcuts and just 2500 ms to weave it in the BPEL process.
All above results not only reflect how fast the compilation and the weaving functions
can be but also, they prove that a BPEL process with E-AspectBPEL license verification
still by far faster than a BPEL process with license verification implemented on the Web
services side. For example, assuming that we have a BPEL process enclosing 25 invoke ac-
tivities that needs an E-AspectBPEL aspect of 25 pointcuts. That means, different security
behaviors (i.e., License verification) for each invoke activity. The total running time of this
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process is equal to the compilation time plus the weaving time of the E-AspectBPEL aspect
plus the runtime of the process. In this example, it is = 1103 + 2140 + 15356 = 18599 ms <
19833 ms, which is the running time of the BPEL having the license verification property
implemented at the Web services level.
4.8 Conclusion
We presented in this chapter a new approach that extends the framework elaborated in
chapter 3 with XrML licensing layer for composite Web services. It offers the ability to
define grants within licenses, associate them with the offered services and transform them
automatically into E-AspectBPEL aspects. These aspects offer a dynamic mechanism to in-
clude and update non functional requirements such as license grants validation into BPEL
processes, at runtime and without affecting their business logic. Besides, it provides a
centralization of security verification at the process level. We discussed as well the perfor-
mance of the BPEL process in different scenarios to demonstrate the effectiveness of our
proposition.
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Chapter 5
Conclusion
Service-Oriented Architecture constitutes an evolution of distributed computing. The main
goal behind this architecture is a worldwide mesh of collaborating services, which are pub-
lished and ready for invocation on the service bus. Web services technology represents one
of the most important and adopted standardized approach that realizes SOA and supports
on-demand services. However, security is still a major concern of Web Services in a dis-
tributed environment. Web service security is one of the thrust areas of research both in
industry as well as in academia. This thesis has mainly focused on addressing this concern
by elaborating a framework suitable to build secure, conflict-free and highly adaptable Web
services composition.
In the sequel, we present a brief summary of the thesis contributions:
1. Extending AspectBPEL language and BPEL meta-model with new Aspect-Oriented
constructs that allow model-driven specification of security aspects, and provide dy-
namic integration and activation based on context-aware conditions in the process
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execution environment.
2. Separating business and security concerns of composite Web services, and hence
developing them separately.
3. Integrating a prioritized ordering mechanism to prevent behavioral conflicts between
the security aspects upon their integration in Web services composition.
4. Adapting standardized licensing mechanism intoWeb services composition to ensure
the fulfillment of security needs in distributed infrastructure.
5. Centralizing security verification at BPEL process level.
6. Creating a unified environment for the specification and design of Web services com-
position and security aspects, while offering the ability to generate robust code from
high level design language.
7. Integrating the elaborated framework in Eclipse, well-known and widely used com-
mercial BPEL development environment.
8. Carrying out a formal verification mechanism for the Web services composition be-
fore and after injecting the security aspects.
As future direction, we are planning to provide a tool whereby our verification mecha-
nism can be automatically achieved. Thus, users can specify the desired properties in high
level and user friendly format, while the corresponding LTL formulas get automatically
generated. In addition, if the verification returns false, the tool will display which path in
the BPEL process diagram is violating the property.
97
Finally, the following is the list of publications derived from the thesis work:
Journal Paper
 Hanine Tout, AzzamMourad and Hadi Otrok. "XrML-RBLicensing approach adapted
to the BPEL process of composite web services". Service Oriented Computing and
Applications (SOCA), February 2013, Springer-Verlag.
Conference Paper
 Hanine Tout, Azzam Mourad, Hamdi Yahyaoui, Chamseddine Talhi and Hadi Otrok.
"Towards a BPELModel-Driven Approach for Web Services Security," in Proc. 10th
Annual International Conference on Privacy, Security and Trust (PST), Paris, France,
July 16-18, 2012, IEEE.
Draft Paper
 "Context-Aware and Model-Driven Approach for Web Services Security and Adapt-
ability".
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